Patchwork Os MCP Server
patchwork-os
npm
v1.2.0-beta.2
Source verified
Published by oolab-labs — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Your personal AI runtime, local-first. Patchwork OS gives any AI model a consistent set of tools, YAML recipes, a delegation policy with approval queue, and a durable trace memory — all on your machine, all under your policy.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claudeDriver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claudeDriver.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claudeDriver.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/dashboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/dashboard.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/dashboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/launchd.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/launchd.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/launchd.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/patchworkInit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/patchworkInit.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import { copyFileSync, existsSync, mk
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/patchworkInit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/gemini/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/gemini/index.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/gemini/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import crypto from "node:crypto"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/installGuard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/installGuard.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/installGuard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/probe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/probe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import { promisify } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/probe.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/datadog.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/datadog.js:331`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://api.${site}/api/v1/validate`, { headers: { "DD-API-KE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/datadog.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/github.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/github.js:408`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.github.com/user", { headers: { Authorizat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/github.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/gmail.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/gmail.js:90`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/gmail.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/googleCalendar.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/googleCalendar.js:105`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/googleCalendar.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/googleDocs.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/googleDocs.js:139`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/googleDocs.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/googleDrive.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/googleDrive.js:90`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", { method: "POST", headers: { "Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/googleDrive.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/connectors/salesforce.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/connectors/salesforce.js:225`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const res = await fetch(`https://${host}/services/oauth2/token`, { method: "POST", headers: { "Con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/connectors/salesforce.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/recipeRoutes.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/recipeRoutes.js:2065`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ghRes = await fetch("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/patchworkos/recipes/main/index.json", { signal: ctl.sig
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/recipeRoutes.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/recipes/tools/gmail.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/recipes/tools/gmail.js:104`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://www.googleapis.com/gmail/v1/users/me/threads/${id}?format=metadata`, { headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/recipes/tools/gmail.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/pluginLoader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/pluginLoader.js:345`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mod = await import(importUrl); } } catch (err) { logger.warn(`Plugin "${manifest.nam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/pluginLoader.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/commands/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/commands/install.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import os from "n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/install.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"patchwork-os" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package patchwork-os
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0-beta.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v1.1.0-beta.4 |
A 92/100 | 21 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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