Coolify (pashvc) MCP Server
@pashvc/mcp-server-coolify
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @pashvc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Coolify API integration with comprehensive resource management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_application_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([create_application, update_application, execute_command, deploy_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_application_logs] → sinks [create_application, update_application, execute_command, deploy_webhook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_application_logs → create_application
high Tool "create_application" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_application" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_application
high Tool "update_application" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_application" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_application
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "install_command" on "create_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "install_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_application · inputSchema.properties.install_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "build_command" on "create_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "build_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_application · inputSchema.properties.build_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "start_command" on "create_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "start_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_application · inputSchema.properties.start_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "install_command" on "update_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "install_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_application · inputSchema.properties.install_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "build_command" on "update_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "build_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_application · inputSchema.properties.build_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "start_command" on "update_application"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_application" takes a command-shaped parameter "start_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_application · inputSchema.properties.start_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "create_application" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_application" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_application
low Mutating tool "update_application" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_application" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_application
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_applicationruns code / shelldeploy_webhooknetwork egressexecute_commandruns code / shellget_application_logsreads sensitive dataupdate_applicationruns code / shellcoolify_healthno sensitive capabilitycoolify_versionno sensitive capabilitycreate_databaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_environment_variableno sensitive capabilitycreate_private_keyno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
create_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_serverno sensitive capabilitycreate_serviceno sensitive capabilitydelete_applicationno sensitive capabilitydelete_databaseno sensitive capabilitydelete_environment_variableno sensitive capabilitydelete_private_keyno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_applicationno sensitive capabilityget_current_teamno sensitive capabilityget_current_team_membersno sensitive capabilityget_databaseno sensitive capabilityget_deploymentno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_server_domainsno sensitive capabilityget_server_resourcesno sensitive capabilityget_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilitylist_applicationsno sensitive capabilitylist_databasesno sensitive capabilitylist_deploymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_environment_variablesno sensitive capabilitylist_private_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_servicesno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilityrestart_applicationno sensitive capabilityrestart_databaseno sensitive capabilityrestart_serviceno sensitive capabilitystart_applicationno sensitive capabilitystart_databaseno sensitive capabilitystart_serviceno sensitive capabilitystop_applicationno sensitive capabilitystop_databaseno sensitive capabilitystop_serviceno sensitive capabilityupdate_databaseno sensitive capabilityupdate_environment_variableno sensitive capabilityupdate_private_keyno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_serviceno sensitive capabilityvalidate_serverno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @pashvc/mcp-server-coolify --onlineOther implementations of Coolify 9
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 10 side by side →
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