Paper Search MCP Server
paper-search-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.4
Published by openags — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A MCP server for searching and downloading academic papers from multiple sources.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_base.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_base.py:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://api.base-search.net/cgi-bin/BaseHttpSearchInterface.fcgi",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_base.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_biorxiv.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_biorxiv.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.biorxiv.org/details/biorxiv/0/1", timeout=5) return response.s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_biorxiv.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_citeseerx.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_citeseerx.py:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/api/search", params={"q": "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_citeseerx.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_crossref.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_crossref.py:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.crossref.org/works?sample=1", timeout=5) return response.statu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_crossref.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_dblp.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_dblp.py:12`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uery response = requests.get( "https://dblp.org/search/publ/api", params={'q': 'test', '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_dblp.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_doaj.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_doaj.py:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://doaj.org/api/search/articles/machine%20learning",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_doaj.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_google_scholar.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_google_scholar.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://scholar.google.com", timeout=5) return response.status_code == 200
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_google_scholar.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_hal.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_hal.py:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://api.archives-ouvertes.fr/search/", params={"q": "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_hal.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_iacr.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_iacr.py:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://eprint.iacr.org", timeout=5) return response.status_code == 200
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_iacr.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_medrxiv.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_medrxiv.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.medRxiv.org/details/medrxiv/0/1", timeout=5) return response.s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_medrxiv.py
Tools 63
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_acmingests untrusted inputdownload_arxivingests untrusted inputdownload_baseingests untrusted inputdownload_biorxivingests untrusted inputdownload_citeseerxingests untrusted inputdownload_crossrefingests untrusted inputdownload_dblpingests untrusted inputdownload_doajingests untrusted inputdownload_halingests untrusted inputdownload_iacringests untrusted input
Show 53 more tools ↓
download_ieeeingests untrusted inputdownload_medrxivingests untrusted inputdownload_openaireingests untrusted inputdownload_openalexingests untrusted inputdownload_pubmedingests untrusted inputdownload_scihubingests untrusted inputdownload_semanticingests untrusted inputdownload_ssrningests untrusted inputdownload_with_fallbackingests untrusted inputdownload_zenodoingests untrusted inputread_acm_paperingests untrusted inputread_ieee_paperingests untrusted inputsearch_iacringests untrusted inputsearch_ssrningests untrusted inputget_crossref_paper_by_doino sensitive capabilityread_arxiv_paperno sensitive capabilityread_base_paperno sensitive capabilityread_biorxiv_paperno sensitive capabilityread_citeseerx_paperno sensitive capabilityread_crossref_paperno sensitive capabilityread_dblp_paperno sensitive capabilityread_doaj_paperno sensitive capabilityread_hal_paperno sensitive capabilityread_iacr_paperno sensitive capabilityread_medrxiv_paperno sensitive capabilityread_openaire_paperno sensitive capabilityread_openalex_paperno sensitive capabilityread_pubmed_paperno sensitive capabilityread_semantic_paperno sensitive capabilityread_ssrn_paperno sensitive capabilityread_zenodo_paperno sensitive capabilitysearch_acmno sensitive capabilitysearch_arxivno sensitive capabilitysearch_baseno sensitive capabilitysearch_biorxivno sensitive capabilitysearch_citeseerxno sensitive capabilitysearch_coreno sensitive capabilitysearch_crossrefno sensitive capabilitysearch_dblpno sensitive capabilitysearch_doajno sensitive capabilitysearch_europepmcno sensitive capabilitysearch_google_scholarno sensitive capabilitysearch_halno sensitive capabilitysearch_ieeeno sensitive capabilitysearch_medrxivno sensitive capabilitysearch_openaireno sensitive capabilitysearch_openalexno sensitive capabilitysearch_papersno sensitive capabilitysearch_pmcno sensitive capabilitysearch_pubmedno sensitive capabilitysearch_semanticno sensitive capabilitysearch_unpaywallno sensitive capabilitysearch_zenodono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (63 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 96/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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