Paper Find MCP Server
paper-find-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A MCP server for searching and downloading academic papers from multiple sources.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (paper_find_mcp/academic_platforms/sci_hub.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`paper_find_mcp/academic_platforms/sci_hub.py:95`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( [ 'curl', '-L', # 跟随重定向
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server paper_find_mcp/academic_platforms/sci_hub.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_biorxiv.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_biorxiv.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.biorxiv.org/details/biorxiv/0/1", timeout=5) return response.s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_biorxiv.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_crossref.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_crossref.py:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.crossref.org/works?sample=1", timeout=5) return response.statu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_crossref.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_google_scholar.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_google_scholar.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://scholar.google.com", timeout=5) return response.status_code == 200
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_google_scholar.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_iacr.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_iacr.py:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://eprint.iacr.org", timeout=5) return response.status_code == 200
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_iacr.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_medrxiv.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_medrxiv.py:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.medRxiv.org/details/medrxiv/0/1", timeout=5) return response.s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_medrxiv.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_repec.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_repec.py:15`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get( "https://ideas.repec.org/", timeout=10, header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_repec.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sci_hub.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sci_hub.py:14`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onds response = requests.get("https://sci-hub.se", timeout=10) return response.status_code == 200 ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_sci_hub.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_semantic.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_semantic.py:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: response = requests.get("https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/5bbfdf2e62f0508c65ba6de9c72fe2066fd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_semantic.py
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_arxivingests untrusted inputdownload_biorxivingests untrusted inputdownload_crossrefingests untrusted inputdownload_iacringests untrusted inputdownload_medrxivingests untrusted inputdownload_pubmedingests untrusted inputdownload_repecingests untrusted inputdownload_scihubingests untrusted inputdownload_semanticingests untrusted inputread_arxiv_paperingests untrusted input
Show 19 more tools ↓
read_biorxiv_paperingests untrusted inputread_iacr_paperingests untrusted inputread_medrxiv_paperingests untrusted inputread_scihub_paperingests untrusted inputread_semantic_paperingests untrusted inputsearch_arxivingests untrusted inputsearch_biorxivingests untrusted inputsearch_google_scholaringests untrusted inputsearch_iacringests untrusted inputsearch_medrxivingests untrusted inputsearch_pubmedingests untrusted inputsearch_semanticingests untrusted inputget_crossref_paper_by_doino sensitive capabilityget_repec_paperno sensitive capabilityread_crossref_paperno sensitive capabilityread_pubmed_paperno sensitive capabilityread_repec_paperno sensitive capabilitysearch_crossrefno sensitive capabilitysearch_repecno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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