Pandamcp MCP Server
pandamcp
npm
v0.1.4
Published by freakboy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js:341`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js:341`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser/raw-cdp-backend.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browser_set_download_behavior]) co-exist with external-action tools ([browser_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browser_set_download_behavior] → sinks [browser_upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browser_set_download_behavior → browser_upload_file
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_set_download_behavioringests untrusted inputbrowser_upload_filenetwork egressbrowser_clear_storageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_close_browserno sensitive capabilitybrowser_close_contextno sensitive capabilitybrowser_create_contextno sensitive capabilitybrowser_drag_and_dropno sensitive capabilitybrowser_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_frame_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_grant_permissionsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_list_contextsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_list_pagesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_new_pageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_pressno sensitive capabilitybrowser_response_bodyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_select_optionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_blocked_urlsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_cookieno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_geolocationno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_storageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_storageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_expressionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_load_stateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_selectorno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_urlno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
C 74/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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