Packet Tracer (Mats2208) MCP Server
packet-tracer-mcp
PyPI
v0.9.0
Published by mats2208 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Cisco Packet Tracer - topology planning, validation, auto-fix, generation, and configuration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (EXTENSION/script-engine/main.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`EXTENSION/script-engine/main.js:137`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; }; try { (new Function("reportResult", js))(report); } catch (e) { captured = "PT_ERROR: " + e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server EXTENSION/script-engine/main.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/bridge_token.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/bridge_token.py:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ipt que PT ejecuta con `new Function()`. Bindear a 127.0.0.1 no impide que la petición se envíe — solo impide leer la re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/bridge_token.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/live_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/live_bridge.py:12`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ever it finds there via new Function(). The token is what closes that; see bridge_token.py. The extension gets the toke
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/live_bridge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/deploy_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/deploy_executor.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: False try: subprocess.run( "clip", input=text.encode("utf-16-le"), chec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/packet_tracer_mcp/infrastructure/execution/deploy_executor.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bridge_token.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bridge_token.py:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: JS que PT ejecuta con `new Function()`. Lo unico que cierra ese agujero es este secreto. Y no tenia un solo test. `gre
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bridge_token.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bridge_security.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bridge_security.py:275`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ ) out = subprocess.run( [_sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=6
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bridge_security.py
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
pt_export_topologynetwork egresspt_open_projectnetwork egresspt_add_deviceno sensitive capabilitypt_add_linkno sensitive capabilitypt_add_moduleno sensitive capabilitypt_add_noteno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_aclno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_acl_objectno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_hardeningno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_interface_tuningno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
pt_apply_natno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_netflowno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_port_securityno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_stpno sensitive capabilitypt_apply_vlanno sensitive capabilitypt_audit_securityno sensitive capabilitypt_backup_configno sensitive capabilitypt_bridge_statusno sensitive capabilitypt_clear_annotationsno sensitive capabilitypt_delete_deviceno sensitive capabilitypt_delete_linkno sensitive capabilitypt_deployno sensitive capabilitypt_device_powerno sensitive capabilitypt_diffno sensitive capabilitypt_estimate_planno sensitive capabilitypt_explain_planno sensitive capabilitypt_exportno sensitive capabilitypt_fix_planno sensitive capabilitypt_full_buildno sensitive capabilitypt_generate_configsno sensitive capabilitypt_generate_scriptno sensitive capabilitypt_get_device_detailsno sensitive capabilitypt_health_checkno sensitive capabilitypt_inspect_portsno sensitive capabilitypt_install_modules_batchno sensitive capabilitypt_list_devicesno sensitive capabilitypt_list_modulesno sensitive capabilitypt_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitypt_list_templatesno sensitive capabilitypt_live_deployno sensitive capabilitypt_load_projectno sensitive capabilitypt_move_deviceno sensitive capabilitypt_plan_topologyno sensitive capabilitypt_project_metadatano sensitive capabilitypt_query_topologyno sensitive capabilitypt_read_packet_traceno sensitive capabilitypt_read_qosno sensitive capabilitypt_read_vlansno sensitive capabilitypt_remove_aclno sensitive capabilitypt_remove_acl_objectno sensitive capabilitypt_remove_natno sensitive capabilitypt_rename_deviceno sensitive capabilitypt_save_projectno sensitive capabilitypt_screenshotno sensitive capabilitypt_send_rawno sensitive capabilitypt_set_portno sensitive capabilitypt_simulation_modeno sensitive capabilitypt_simulation_stepno sensitive capabilitypt_validate_planno sensitive capabilitypt_verify_connectivityno sensitive capabilitypt_workspace_optionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan packet-tracer-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Packet Tracer 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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