Overmind MCP Server
overmind-mcp
npm
v3.10.0
Published by deamondev888 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Orchestrateur universel agents IA multi-modeles via MCP. Inclut le protocole 'Custom-Nickname' pour identifier vos agents avec des surnoms originaux (The Chaos Prophet, Shadow Sniper, etc.), l'isolation mémoire (Private Memory Context) et le support pour
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 10.6 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 7 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/launch.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/launch.cjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xec, spawn } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const path = require("path"); const SCRIPT_DIR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/launch.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/InstallHelper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/InstallHelper.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/InstallHelper.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/processRegistry.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/processRegistry.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { getWorkspaceDir } from './config.js'; import { rootLogger } from './log
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/processRegistry.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { spawn, exec } from 'child_process'; import { CONFIG, resolveConfigPath, getWorkspaceDir } from '../lib/config.js'; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/ClineRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/ClineRunner.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CONFIG, resolveConfigPath } from '../lib/config.js'; import { getLastSe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/ClineRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/GeminiRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/GeminiRunner.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CONFIG, resolveConfigPath } from '../lib/config.js'; import { getLastSe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/GeminiRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/HermesPoolClient.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/HermesPoolClient.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { rootLogger } from '../lib/logger.js';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/HermesPoolClient.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/HermesProfileManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/HermesProfileManager.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/HermesProfileManager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/HermesRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/HermesRunner.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { CONFIG, getWorkspaceDir, getSharedHermesHome, getAgentHermesHome } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/HermesRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/KanbanAdapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/KanbanAdapter.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { rootLogger } from '../lib/logger.js';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/KanbanAdapter.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/launch.cjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/launch.cjs:31`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pid} killed`); exec(`taskkill /F /PID ${pid}`, { windowsHide: true }, () => {}); } setTimeout(res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/launch.cjs
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js:35`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: hild.pid) { exec(`taskkill /F /T /PID ${child.pid}`, () => { // taskkill peut échouer si le
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/ClaudeRunner.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"overmind-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package overmind-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.10.0 latest |
B 82/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v3.9.1 |
B 82/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v3.9.0 |
B 82/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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