Dolex — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@outsidedata/dolex",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@outsidedata/dolex"
},
"server": {
"name": "@outsidedata/dolex"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/src/cleaning/exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cleaning/exec.js:74`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/cleaning/exec.js"
},
"evidence": "mits() ns = {} try: exec(compile(tree, \"<clean>\", \"exec\"), ns) except Exception as e: print(json.dumps({\"rejecte",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/src/cleaning/exec.js",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/analysis/clean-exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/analysis/clean-exec.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/analysis/clean-exec.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'fs'; import { tmpdir } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/analysis/clean-exec.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cleaning/exec.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cleaning/exec.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/cleaning/exec.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'fs'; import { tmpdir } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/cleaning/exec.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/render.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/render.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/cli/render.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { dolexHome } from './paths.js'; import { importOptional } from '../utils",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/cli/render.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/capabilities.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/capabilities.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/capabilities.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'fs'; import { OPTIONAL_FEATURES } from './optional",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/capabilities.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/src/utils/optional-deps.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/optional-deps.js:65`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/optional-deps.js"
},
"evidence": "{ return (await import(specifier)); } catch (e) { if (isModuleNotFound(e)) throw new",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/src/utils/optional-deps.js",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_patterns",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "load_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"execute_sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "query_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "transform_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "promote_columns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_transforms",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drop_columns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clean_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "server_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "visualize_cli_only",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refine_visualization_cli_only",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0a283f8507e537ff91257739eaa3dade3e9f7b2407264386b4e7b6dea4c0bee5",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}