Ours.network — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@ours.network/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@ours.network/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@ours.network/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_messages → list_files → send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_messages → list_files → send_message"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_messages"
],
"sources": [
"list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"send_message"
],
"path": [
"get_messages",
"list_files",
"send_message"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_messages",
"to": "list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "list_files",
"to": "send_message",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/connector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/connector.js:36`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/connector.js"
},
"evidence": "ode.process(l,t));let f=new Function(`${Zr.default.self}`,`${Zr.default.scope}`,l)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/connector.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "ode.process(l,t));let f=new Function(`${Tr.default.self}`,`${Tr.default.scope}`,l)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "rt{spawn as L}from\"node:child_process\";import{realpathSync as v}from\"node:fs\";import{fileURLToPath as j}from\"node:url\";i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"save_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"save_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"save_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "save_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:5`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": ",{runConnector:e}=await import(t.href);await e({leaseToken:f,clientPid:u,version:l,bindIdentity:M})}async function B(){a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"save_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"save_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "save_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_messages"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_messages",
"list_files",
"send_message"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_messages → list_files → send_message."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_contact_commands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_command",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_invite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_invites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_invite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_local_contact_book",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_local_book_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "respond_to_introduction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rename_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_incoming_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"save_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_history_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_temporary_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_temporary_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_root_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "define_local_identity_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "choose_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_identities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "current_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_bio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "advertise_migrate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_persona",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "73a3b16dd36578a42c22e7d74d1fb4a65e5e1a13c0a99f94c375ee7d1489d0dc",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 3,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}