444host MCP Server
@otwa/444host-mcp
npm
v1.8.0
Published by @otwa — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for 444host.com — manage VPS, hosting, domains, billing, tickets and webhooks, and place real orders, from Claude and other MCP-capable AI tools.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([h444_hosting_list_files, h444_hosting_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([h444_hosting_set_cron, h444_list_webhooks, h444_get_webhook, h444_list_webhook_deliveries, h444_create_webhook, h444_update_webhook, h444_delete_webhook, h444_rotate_webhook_secret, h444_redeliver_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [h444_hosting_list_files, h444_hosting_read_file] → sinks [h444_hosting_set_cron, h444_list_webhooks, h444_get_webhook, h444_list_webhook_deliveries, h4
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow h444_hosting_list_files → h444_hosting_set_cron
high Tool "h444_hosting_set_cron" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "h444_hosting_set_cron" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool h444_hosting_set_cron
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "h444_create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "h444_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool h444_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "h444_update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "h444_update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool h444_update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "h444_hosting_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "h444_hosting_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool h444_hosting_write_file
medium Tool "h444_hosting_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "h444_hosting_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool h444_hosting_delete_file
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "h444_hosting_set_cron"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "h444_hosting_set_cron" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool h444_hosting_set_cron · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "h444_hosting_set_cron" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "h444_hosting_set_cron" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool h444_hosting_set_cron
low Mutating tool "h444_hosting_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "h444_hosting_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool h444_hosting_write_file
low Mutating tool "h444_hosting_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "h444_hosting_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool h444_hosting_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "h444_hosting_list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "h444_hosting_list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool h444_hosting_list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "h444_hosting_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "h444_hosting_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool h444_hosting_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "h444_hosting_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "h444_hosting_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool h444_hosting_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "h444_hosting_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "h444_hosting_delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool h444_hosting_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 89
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
h444_create_webhooknetwork egressh444_delete_webhooknetwork egressh444_get_webhooknetwork egressh444_hosting_delete_filewrites filesh444_hosting_list_filesreads sensitive datah444_hosting_read_filereads sensitive datah444_hosting_set_cronruns code / shellh444_hosting_write_filewrites filesh444_list_webhook_deliveriesnetwork egressh444_list_webhooksnetwork egress
Show 79 more tools ↓
h444_redeliver_webhooknetwork egressh444_rotate_webhook_secretnetwork egressh444_update_webhooknetwork egressh444_assign_pool_ipsno sensitive capabilityh444_change_vps_planno sensitive capabilityh444_close_ticketno sensitive capabilityh444_create_aliasno sensitive capabilityh444_create_mailboxno sensitive capabilityh444_create_poolno sensitive capabilityh444_create_pool_serverno sensitive capabilityh444_delete_aliasno sensitive capabilityh444_delete_mailboxno sensitive capabilityh444_delete_vps_ptrno sensitive capabilityh444_get_accountno sensitive capabilityh444_get_domainno sensitive capabilityh444_get_domain_contactno sensitive capabilityh444_get_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_get_invoiceno sensitive capabilityh444_get_poolno sensitive capabilityh444_get_ticketno sensitive capabilityh444_get_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_get_vps_statsno sensitive capabilityh444_get_walletno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_add_databaseno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_create_backupno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_delete_backupno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_get_cronno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_list_backupsno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_list_databasesno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_logsno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_remove_databaseno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_restore_backupno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_set_phpno sensitive capabilityh444_hosting_statsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_domain_aliasesno sensitive capabilityh444_list_domain_mailboxesno sensitive capabilityh444_list_domainsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_list_invoicesno sensitive capabilityh444_list_mail_domainsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_mailboxesno sensitive capabilityh444_list_os_templatesno sensitive capabilityh444_list_pool_ipsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_pool_productsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_poolsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_productsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_ticketsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_vps_addonsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_vps_ipsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_vps_plan_optionsno sensitive capabilityh444_list_wallet_transactionsno sensitive capabilityh444_open_ticketno sensitive capabilityh444_order_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_order_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_pay_invoiceno sensitive capabilityh444_power_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_purchase_vps_addonno sensitive capabilityh444_quote_poolno sensitive capabilityh444_quote_pool_resizeno sensitive capabilityh444_reinstall_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_remove_vps_addonno sensitive capabilityh444_rename_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_reply_ticketno sensitive capabilityh444_request_domain_auth_codeno sensitive capabilityh444_reset_mailbox_passwordno sensitive capabilityh444_reset_vps_passwordno sensitive capabilityh444_resize_poolno sensitive capabilityh444_retry_hosting_sslno sensitive capabilityh444_set_domain_contactno sensitive capabilityh444_set_hosting_phpno sensitive capabilityh444_set_vps_ptrno sensitive capabilityh444_suspend_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_terminate_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_terminate_poolno sensitive capabilityh444_terminate_vpsno sensitive capabilityh444_unsuspend_hostingno sensitive capabilityh444_update_domainno sensitive capabilityh444_vps_ssono sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (89 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v1.0.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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