Omnicord MCP Server
@orygn/omnicord
npm
v1.3.0
Published by @orygn — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Omnicord: an MCP server for Discord. Chat, moderate, administrate, and build out entire servers through any MCP client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Tool "update_app_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_app_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_app_command
high Tool "delete_app_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "delete_app_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool delete_app_command
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_message, read_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_app_command, delete_app_command, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, send_webhook_message, crosspost_message, lock_channel, unlock_channel, send_message, forward_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_message, read_messages] → sinks [update_app_command, delete_app_command, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, send_webhook_message, cr
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_message → update_app_command
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/wizard.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/wizard.js:122`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch(`https://discord.com/api/v10${path}`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bot ${token}` }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/wizard.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "avatar_url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "avatar_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.avatar_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "avatar_url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "avatar_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.avatar_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "avatar_url_override" on "send_webhook_message"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "send_webhook_message" takes a URL/host parameter "avatar_url_override" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool send_webhook_message · inputSchema.properties.avatar_url_override
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "update_app_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_app_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_app_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "delete_app_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "delete_app_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool delete_app_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/config.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/config.js:30`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t: true }); const pkg = require(packageJsonPath); export const VERSION = pkg.version; // Pure: given a parsed bots.json
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config.js
low Mutating tool "update_app_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_app_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_app_command
low Mutating tool "delete_app_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_app_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_app_command
Tools 155
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egresscrosspost_messagenetwork egressdelete_app_commandruns code / shelldelete_webhooknetwork egressforward_messagenetwork egressget_messageingests untrusted inputlock_channelnetwork egressread_messagesingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egresssend_webhook_messagenetwork egress
Show 145 more tools ↓
unlock_channelnetwork egressupdate_app_commandruns code / shellupdate_webhooknetwork egressadd_reactionsno sensitive capabilityadd_thread_memberno sensitive capabilityassign_roleno sensitive capabilityban_memberno sensitive capabilitybulk_banno sensitive capabilitybulk_delete_messagesno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_rolesno sensitive capabilitycancel_eventno sensitive capabilitycancel_scheduled_messageno sensitive capabilityclear_channel_permissionsno sensitive capabilityclear_reactionsno sensitive capabilityclone_channelno sensitive capabilityclone_roleno sensitive capabilitycreate_automod_ruleno sensitive capabilitycreate_channelno sensitive capabilitycreate_emojino sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_forum_postno sensitive capabilitycreate_forum_tagno sensitive capabilitycreate_inviteno sensitive capabilitycreate_pollno sensitive capabilitycreate_roleno sensitive capabilitycreate_server_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_soundboard_soundno sensitive capabilitycreate_stickerno sensitive capabilitycreate_threadno sensitive capabilitydelete_automod_ruleno sensitive capabilitydelete_blueprintno sensitive capabilitydelete_channelno sensitive capabilitydelete_emojino sensitive capabilitydelete_forum_postno sensitive capabilitydelete_forum_tagno sensitive capabilitydelete_integrationno sensitive capabilitydelete_inviteno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilitydelete_roleno sensitive capabilitydelete_server_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_soundboard_soundno sensitive capabilitydelete_stickerno sensitive capabilitydelete_threadno sensitive capabilitydiff_blueprintno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_memberno sensitive capabilityedit_messageno sensitive capabilityend_pollno sensitive capabilityend_stageno sensitive capabilityexecute_build_planno sensitive capabilityexplain_permissionsno sensitive capabilityexport_server_blueprintno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilityfollow_announcement_channelno sensitive capabilityget_audit_logno sensitive capabilityget_blueprintno sensitive capabilityget_bot_infono sensitive capabilityget_channelno sensitive capabilityget_channel_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_event_attendeesno sensitive capabilityget_inviteno sensitive capabilityget_memberno sensitive capabilityget_member_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_onboardingno sensitive capabilityget_poll_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_rate_limit_statusno sensitive capabilityget_reactionsno sensitive capabilityget_recent_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_reference_layoutno sensitive capabilityget_role_membersno sensitive capabilityget_server_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_server_previewno sensitive capabilityget_server_widgetno sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityget_welcome_screenno sensitive capabilitykick_memberno sensitive capabilitylist_app_commandsno sensitive capabilitylist_automod_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_bansno sensitive capabilitylist_blueprintsno sensitive capabilitylist_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_emojisno sensitive capabilitylist_event_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_forum_postsno sensitive capabilitylist_integrationsno sensitive capabilitylist_invitesno sensitive capabilitylist_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_pinned_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_reference_layoutsno sensitive capabilitylist_rolesno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduled_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_server_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_soundboard_soundsno sensitive capabilitylist_stagesno sensitive capabilitylist_stickersno sensitive capabilitylist_thread_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_threadsno sensitive capabilitylist_voice_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitypin_messageno sensitive capabilityplan_server_buildno sensitive capabilityprune_membersno sensitive capabilityregister_app_commandno sensitive capabilityremove_reactionno sensitive capabilityremove_roleno sensitive capabilityremove_thread_memberno sensitive capabilityremove_timeoutno sensitive capabilityreorder_channelsno sensitive capabilityreorder_rolesno sensitive capabilityreply_to_forum_postno sensitive capabilityrun_setup_checkno sensitive capabilitysave_blueprintno sensitive capabilityschedule_messageno sensitive capabilitysearch_membersno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysend_dmno sensitive capabilityset_bot_presenceno sensitive capabilityset_channel_permissionsno sensitive capabilityset_incident_actionsno sensitive capabilityset_voice_channel_statusno sensitive capabilitystart_stageno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_eventsno sensitive capabilitysync_server_templateno sensitive capabilitytimeout_memberno sensitive capabilityunban_memberno sensitive capabilityunpin_messageno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_eventsno sensitive capabilityupdate_automod_ruleno sensitive capabilityupdate_channelno sensitive capabilityupdate_emojino sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_forum_postno sensitive capabilityupdate_forum_tagno sensitive capabilityupdate_memberno sensitive capabilityupdate_onboardingno sensitive capabilityupdate_roleno sensitive capabilityupdate_serverno sensitive capabilityupdate_server_widgetno sensitive capabilityupdate_soundboard_soundno sensitive capabilityupdate_stageno sensitive capabilityupdate_stickerno sensitive capabilityupdate_threadno sensitive capabilityupdate_welcome_screenno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (155 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.1 |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.2.0 |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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