Orgo Ai MCP Server
@orgo-ai/mcp
npm
v3.0.0
Published by @orgo-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Orgo virtual computer control — works with Claude Code, Claude Desktop, and any MCP client
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: orgo_download_file → orgo_list_files → orgo_bash. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow orgo_download_file → orgo_list_files → orgo_bash
high Tool "orgo_bash" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "orgo_bash" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool orgo_bash
high Tool "orgo_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "orgo_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool orgo_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: et terminal preferred), exec (Python) - **Files**: list, upload, export, download - **AI Agent**: completions (autonomou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
low Mutating tool "orgo_bash" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "orgo_bash" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool orgo_bash
low Mutating tool "orgo_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "orgo_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool orgo_exec
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
orgo_bashruns code / shellorgo_download_fileingests untrusted inputorgo_execruns code / shellorgo_list_filesreads sensitive dataorgo_upload_filenetwork egressorgo_clickno sensitive capabilityorgo_clone_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_completionsno sensitive capabilityorgo_create_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_create_workspaceno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
orgo_delete_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_delete_threadno sensitive capabilityorgo_dragno sensitive capabilityorgo_ensure_runningno sensitive capabilityorgo_export_fileno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_creditsno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_profileno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_threadno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_transactionsno sensitive capabilityorgo_get_workspaceno sensitive capabilityorgo_keyno sensitive capabilityorgo_list_computersno sensitive capabilityorgo_list_templatesno sensitive capabilityorgo_list_threadsno sensitive capabilityorgo_list_workspacesno sensitive capabilityorgo_resize_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_restart_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_screenshotno sensitive capabilityorgo_scrollno sensitive capabilityorgo_star_templateno sensitive capabilityorgo_starred_templatesno sensitive capabilityorgo_start_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_start_streamno sensitive capabilityorgo_stop_computerno sensitive capabilityorgo_stop_streamno sensitive capabilityorgo_stream_statusno sensitive capabilityorgo_typeno sensitive capabilityorgo_vnc_passwordno sensitive capabilityorgo_workspace_by_nameno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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