Orchestrator — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "orchestrator-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "orchestrator-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "orchestrator-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (smoke_workflow_live.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`smoke_workflow_live.py:135`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "smoke_workflow_live.py"
},
"evidence": "str) -> str: done = subprocess.run([\"git\", *args], cwd=repo, capture_output=True, text=True) if done.returncode",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "smoke_workflow_live.py",
"line": 135,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded GitHub token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_review_secrets.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded GitHub token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `tests/test_review_secrets.py:28`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_review_secrets.py"
},
"evidence": "GitHub token: ghp_…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "github-token",
"file": "tests/test_review_secrets.py",
"line": 28
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/fixtures/fake_cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/fixtures/fake_cli.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/fixtures/fake_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "N) grandchild = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, \"-c\", \"import time; time.sleep(300)\"]) with open(sys.a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/fixtures/fake_cli.py",
"line": 50,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_entrypoint.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_entrypoint.py:89`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli_entrypoint.py"
},
"evidence": "r(tmp_path) done = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"orchestrator_mcp.server\"], cwd=tmp_path,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli_entrypoint.py",
"line": 89,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_code_execution.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_code_execution.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_code_execution.py"
},
"evidence": "first\"], ): subprocess.run([\"git\", *args], cwd=path, check=True, capture_output=True) return path @pyt",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_code_execution.py",
"line": 103,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_consult_store.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_consult_store.py:335`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_consult_store.py"
},
"evidence": "art_at)] openers = [subprocess.Popen(args, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_consult_store.py",
"line": 335,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_workflow_service.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_workflow_service.py:211`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_workflow_service.py"
},
"evidence": "\", \"t\"], ): subprocess.run(command, cwd=path, check=True) (path / \"src\").mkdir() (path / \"src\" / \"a.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_workflow_service.py",
"line": 211,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"orchestrator-mcp-server\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "orchestrator-mcp-server"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "orchestrator_list_consult_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_get_consultation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_consultation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_request_delete_all_consultations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_all_consultations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_review_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_retry_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_finalize_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_apply_fixes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_record_fix_round",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_cancel_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_test_reviewers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_get_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_list_reviews",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_request_delete_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_all_reviews",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_plan_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_run_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_record_host_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_plan_replan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_replan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_workflow_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_request_delete_all_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_delete_all_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f4813c843dd45deb7aa15ae47bd10142dc1cae5079f9e53c2e6db9e240c43231",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 6,
"info": 1
}
}
}