orcaslicer-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.5
Published by maxellis — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`mcpb/server/index.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const os = require("os"); const path = require("path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcpb/server/index.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/extract_settings_schema.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r: try: r = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(src.parent), "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/extract_settings_schema.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
consultingests untrusted inputapply_and_sliceno sensitive capabilityarrange_plateno sensitive capabilityauto_orientno sensitive capabilitycancel_sliceno sensitive capabilitycheck_placementno sensitive capabilitycheck_profile_physicsno sensitive capabilitycompare_settingsno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_presetno sensitive capabilitydescribe_settingno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_plateno sensitive capabilityduplicate_objectno sensitive capabilityedit_presetno sensitive capabilityfind_config_keysno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_gcodeno sensitive capabilityget_job_statusno sensitive capabilityget_preset_configno sensitive capabilityget_slice_breakdownno sensitive capabilityget_slice_statusno sensitive capabilityget_slice_warningsno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_presetsno sensitive capabilityload_modelno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityrename_presetno sensitive capabilitysave_presetno sensitive capabilitysearch_settingsno sensitive capabilityselect_presetno sensitive capabilityset_configno sensitive capabilityset_height_rangeno sensitive capabilityset_layer_heightno sensitive capabilityset_object_configno sensitive capabilitysliceno sensitive capabilityslice_and_waitno sensitive capabilitytransform_objectno sensitive capabilitywatch_eventsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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