Orbitneststudio MCP Server
@orbitneststudio/mcp-server
npm
v1.3.0
Published by @orbitneststudio — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: orbitnest_download_file → orbitnest_execute_sql → orbitnest_create_policy. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow orbitnest_download_file → orbitnest_execute_sql → orbitnest_create_policy
high Tool "orbitnest_create_policy" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "orbitnest_create_policy" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool orbitnest_create_policy
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/oauth-login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/oauth-login.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; /** How long we wait for the user t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/oauth-login.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/auth/oauth-login.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/auth/oauth-login.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { AddressInfo } from 'node:net'; import type { AppConfig } from '../types
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/auth/oauth-login.ts
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "orbitnest_create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "orbitnest_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool orbitnest_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "orbitnest_delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "orbitnest_delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool orbitnest_delete_files
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "orbitnest_create_policy"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "orbitnest_create_policy" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool orbitnest_create_policy · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "orbitnest_create_policy" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "orbitnest_create_policy" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool orbitnest_create_policy
low Mutating tool "orbitnest_delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "orbitnest_delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool orbitnest_delete_files
Tools 113
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
orbitnest_create_policyruns code / shellorbitnest_create_webhooknetwork egressorbitnest_delete_fileswrites filesorbitnest_delete_webhooknetwork egressorbitnest_download_fileingests untrusted inputorbitnest_execute_sqlreads sensitive dataorbitnest_get_env_variablesreads sensitive dataorbitnest_get_schemaingests untrusted inputorbitnest_list_filesreads sensitive dataorbitnest_set_sms_confignetwork egress
Show 103 more tools ↓
orbitnest_test_smsnetwork egressorbitnest_test_webhooknetwork egressorbitnest_upload_filenetwork egressorbitnest_add_decisionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_add_eventno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_add_featureno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_add_taskno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_admin_signinno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_admin_signoutno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_admin_signupno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_admin_signup_verifiedno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_broadcastno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_bulk_deleteno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_bulk_insertno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_bulk_updateno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_complete_taskno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_adminno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_analytics_tokenno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_api_keysno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_bucketno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_env_variableno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_functionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_jobno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_projectno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_create_tableno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_adminno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_bucketno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_env_variableno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_functionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_jobno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_policyno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_projectno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_delete_rowno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_disable_realtimeno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_disable_rlsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_enable_extensionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_enable_realtimeno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_enable_rlsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_export_logsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_activityno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_adminno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_crashesno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_eventsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_funnelno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_overviewno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_performanceno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_analytics_retentionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_api_keysno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_bucket_sizeno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_connection_stringno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_dashboard_statsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_decisionsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_functionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_function_logsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_jobno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_job_runsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_log_statsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_open_tasksno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_profileno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_projectno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_project_contextno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_project_healthno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_public_urlno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_recent_changesno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_rls_statusno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_slow_queriesno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_sms_configno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_smtp_settingsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_table_datano sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_top_analytics_eventsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_get_top_analytics_screensno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_insert_rowno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_adminsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_analytics_tokensno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_bucketsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_functionsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_jobsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_migrationsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_policiesno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_realtime_tablesno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_loginno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_migration_statusno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_query_logsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_refresh_tokenno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_request_verificationno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_revoke_analytics_tokenno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_run_migrationsno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_search_memoryno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_set_active_projectno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_set_project_profileno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_sync_memoryno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_toggle_debug_modeno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_trigger_jobno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_adminno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_env_variableno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_featureno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_functionno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_jobno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_projectno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_rowno sensitive capabilityorbitnest_update_smtp_settingsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (113 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @orbitneststudio/mcp-server --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ado Browser MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe Experience Dev MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aemet MCP server.
Security scan results for the Affinity Mcp Bridge MCP server.