Orangepro MCP Server
@orangepro/orangepro-mcp
npm
v0.2.40
Published by @orangepro — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
OrangePro (`opro`) — a local-first, BYOK CLI + MCP server that builds an evidence graph from a local checkout, ingests runtime coverage, and generates grounded tests. Metadata-only exports; no source upload; generated tests stay local.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/local/viz/d3.bundle.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/viz/d3.bundle.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 3;function Wu(t){return new Function(\"d\",\"return {\"+t.map((function(t,n){return JSON.stringify(t)+\": d[\"+n+'] || \
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/viz/d3.bundle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/analyze/coverageArtifacts.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/analyze/coverageArtifacts.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/analyze/coverageArtifacts.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/cli.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/generate/generator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/generate/generator.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/generate/generator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/jobs/notify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/jobs/notify.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; const BELL = String.fromCharCode(7); // ASCII BEL — terminal beep, zero deps exp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/jobs/notify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/operations.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/operations.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/operations.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local/score/risk.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/score/risk.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; const ENTRY_PATH_RE = /(^|\/)(routes?|controllers?|handlers?|jobs?|workers?|proc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/score/risk.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/local/generate/compareReport.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/generate/compareReport.js:399`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: REQUIRED — this test's import(s) collide with name(s) already")); lines.push(cmt("bound earlier in this com
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/generate/compareReport.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/local/generate/generator.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/local/generate/generator.js:1961`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return `Unresolved import(s) ${importErrors.join(", ")} — they do not resolve from the generated test's location. G
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local/generate/generator.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/spikes/dynamic-proof-spike.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/spikes/dynamic-proof-spike.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { cpSync, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, rea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/spikes/dynamic-proof-spike.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/spikes/go-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/spikes/go-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { cpSync, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, rm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/spikes/go-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/spikes/java-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/spikes/java-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { cpSync, existsSync, lstatSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/spikes/java-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/spikes/python-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/spikes/python-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileURL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/spikes/python-dynamic-proof-spike.mjs
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
orangepro_ai_flowsno sensitive capabilityorangepro_ai_linksno sensitive capabilityorangepro_analyze_sourcesno sensitive capabilityorangepro_changed_impactno sensitive capabilityorangepro_doctorno sensitive capabilityorangepro_explain_testno sensitive capabilityorangepro_export_evidence_packno sensitive capabilityorangepro_find_test_gapsno sensitive capabilityorangepro_generate_testsno sensitive capabilityorangepro_graph_scoreno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
orangepro_proveno sensitive capabilityorangepro_prove_loopno sensitive capabilityorangepro_record_runno sensitive capabilityorangepro_rtmno sensitive capabilityorangepro_startno sensitive capabilityorangepro_statsno sensitive capabilityorangepro_statusno sensitive capabilityorangepro_update_graphno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.40 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v0.2.38 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.35 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.2.32 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.2.31 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.2.30 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.2.29 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.2.28 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.2.26 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v0.2.23 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @orangepro/orangepro-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Orangepro 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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