Oracle Db (PyPI) MCP Server
oracle-db-mcp
PyPI
v0.0.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Model Context Protocol server to access oracle database
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([explain_query]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_dml_sql, exec_ddl_sql, exec_pro_sql]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [explain_query] → sinks [exec_dml_sql, exec_ddl_sql, exec_pro_sql]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow explain_query → exec_dml_sql
high Tool "exec_dml_sql" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_dml_sql" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_dml_sql
high Tool "exec_ddl_sql" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_ddl_sql" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_ddl_sql
high Tool "exec_pro_sql" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_pro_sql" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_pro_sql
low Mutating tool "exec_dml_sql" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_dml_sql" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_dml_sql
low Mutating tool "exec_ddl_sql" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_ddl_sql" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_ddl_sql
low Mutating tool "exec_pro_sql" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_pro_sql" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_pro_sql
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_ddl_sqlruns code / shellexec_dml_sqlruns code / shellexec_pro_sqlruns code / shellexplain_queryreads sensitive dataanalyze_db_healthno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tableno sensitive capabilityget_object_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_top_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
list_tablesno sensitive capabilityread_queryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan oracle-db-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Oracle Db 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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