Jobber (opsconduit) MCP Server
@opsconduit/jobber-mcp
npm
v0.1.3
Published by @opsconduit — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Customer-hosted MCP server for read-only Jobber operations queries.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-syntax.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-syntax.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:path"; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-syntax.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/security-regression.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/security-regression.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { once } from "node:events"; import { mkdtemp, rm } from "node:fs/promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/security-regression.js
Tools 6
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
jobber_accountno sensitive capabilityjobber_auth_urlno sensitive capabilityjobber_clients_sampleno sensitive capabilityjobber_exchange_codeno sensitive capabilityjobber_graphql_readno sensitive capabilityjobber_refresh_tokenno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @opsconduit/jobber-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Jobber 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
MCP server for the Jobber field service management API — client management, job scheduling, quoting, invoicing, and service request intake
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