Openvideokit MCP Server
openvideokit
PyPI
v0.1.4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A scene-based, AI-first video editor. A built-in copilot proposes edits you accept or reject, and any MCP agent can drive it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py:232`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: code = sys.stdin.read() exec(compile(_code, "<sandbox>", "exec"), {"__builtins__": _safe_builtins}) """.replace("__ALLOW
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/openvideokit/gsap_validator.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/gsap_validator.py:67`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rage", "eval", "Function(", "setTimeout", "setInterval", "requestAnimationFrame", "import(",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/gsap_validator.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py:232`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: code = sys.stdin.read() exec(compile(_code, "<sandbox>", "exec"), {"__builtins__": _safe_builtins}) """.replace("__ALLOW
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/ai/sandbox.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/cli.py:773`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: th} with {chosen}") subprocess.call([chosen, str(path)]) app.add_typer(config_app, name="config") def main() ->
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/mcp/server.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l": _dispatch_tool} exec(source, namespace) fn = namespace[fn_name] fn.__doc__ = description fn.__name__
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/mcp/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/rendering.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/rendering.py:341`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bprocess proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=log_file, stderr=subprocess.ST
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/rendering.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/templates_preview.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/templates_preview.py:212`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/templates_preview.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/openvideokit/voiceover.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/openvideokit/voiceover.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -> float: result = subprocess.run( ["ffprobe", "-v", "quiet", "-print_format", "json", "-show_format", str(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/openvideokit/voiceover.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate_templates_poster.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate_templates_poster.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [ "ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate_templates_poster.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/ai/test_sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/ai/test_sandbox.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss`` - ``open()`` / ``exec()`` / ``eval()`` / ``compile()`` - ``__subclasses__`` / ``__globals__`` / ``__import__``
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/ai/test_sandbox.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_rendering.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_rendering.py:359`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort subprocess subprocess.run( ["ffmpeg", "-y", "-f", "lavfi", "-i", "anullsrc=r=44100:cl=mono",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_rendering.py
Tools 2
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_project_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_projects_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (2 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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