Openspec (Lumiaqian) MCP Server
openspec-mcp
npm
v0.4.2
Source verified
Published by lumiaqian — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for OpenSpec - spec-driven development with real-time dashboard and approval workflow
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/api/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/api/server.js:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; /** * 自动打开浏览器 */ function openBrowser(url) { const platform = process.plat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/api/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/openspec-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/openspec-cli.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/openspec-cli.js
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
openspec_add_reviewno sensitive capabilityopenspec_ai_analyze_contextno sensitive capabilityopenspec_analyze_contextno sensitive capabilityopenspec_approve_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_archive_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_batch_update_tasksno sensitive capabilityopenspec_create_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_critique_proposalno sensitive capabilityopenspec_generate_proposalno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_approval_statusno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
openspec_get_critique_resultno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_instructionsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_progress_summaryno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_project_contextno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_review_summaryno sensitive capabilityopenspec_get_tasksno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_changesno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_cross_service_docsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_pending_approvalsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_reviewsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_revisionsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_specsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_list_templatesno sensitive capabilityopenspec_preview_templateno sensitive capabilityopenspec_read_cross_service_docno sensitive capabilityopenspec_record_revisionno sensitive capabilityopenspec_reject_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_reply_reviewno sensitive capabilityopenspec_request_approvalno sensitive capabilityopenspec_resolve_reviewno sensitive capabilityopenspec_save_proposalno sensitive capabilityopenspec_setup_hooksno sensitive capabilityopenspec_show_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_show_specno sensitive capabilityopenspec_sync_revisionsno sensitive capabilityopenspec_update_revisionno sensitive capabilityopenspec_update_taskno sensitive capabilityopenspec_validate_allno sensitive capabilityopenspec_validate_changeno sensitive capabilityopenspec_validate_specno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan openspec-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Openspec 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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