Opencode (AlaeddineMessadi) MCP Server

opencode-mcp npm v1.11.0

Published by alaeddinemessadi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server that wraps the OpenCode AI headless server API — 80 tools, 10 resources, 6 prompts with multi-project support for any MCP client

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([opencode_file_list]) and tools that can send data out ([opencode_shell_execute, opencode_project_init, opencode_tui_execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [opencode_file_list] → sinks [opencode_shell_execute, opencode_project_init, opencode_tui_execute_command]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow opencode_file_list → opencode_shell_execute

high Tool "opencode_shell_execute" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "opencode_shell_execute" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool opencode_shell_execute

high Tool "opencode_tui_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "opencode_tui_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool opencode_tui_execute_command

low Mutating tool "opencode_shell_execute" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "opencode_shell_execute" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool opencode_shell_execute

low Mutating tool "opencode_tui_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "opencode_tui_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool opencode_tui_execute_command

Tools 80

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • opencode_file_listreads sensitive data
  • opencode_project_initnetwork egress
  • opencode_shell_executeruns code / shell
  • opencode_tui_execute_commandruns code / shell
  • opencode_agent_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_askno sensitive capability
  • opencode_auth_setno sensitive capability
  • opencode_checkno sensitive capability
  • opencode_command_executeno sensitive capability
  • opencode_command_listno sensitive capability
Show 70 more tools ↓
  • opencode_config_getno sensitive capability
  • opencode_config_providersno sensitive capability
  • opencode_config_updateno sensitive capability
  • opencode_contextno sensitive capability
  • opencode_conversationno sensitive capability
  • opencode_events_pollno sensitive capability
  • opencode_file_readno sensitive capability
  • opencode_file_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_find_fileno sensitive capability
  • opencode_find_symbolno sensitive capability
  • opencode_find_textno sensitive capability
  • opencode_fireno sensitive capability
  • opencode_formatter_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_healthno sensitive capability
  • opencode_instance_disposeno sensitive capability
  • opencode_logno sensitive capability
  • opencode_lsp_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_mcp_addno sensitive capability
  • opencode_mcp_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_message_getno sensitive capability
  • opencode_message_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_message_sendno sensitive capability
  • opencode_message_send_asyncno sensitive capability
  • opencode_path_getno sensitive capability
  • opencode_permission_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_project_currentno sensitive capability
  • opencode_project_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_auth_methodsno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_modelsno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_oauth_authorizeno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_oauth_callbackno sensitive capability
  • opencode_provider_testno sensitive capability
  • opencode_replyno sensitive capability
  • opencode_review_changesno sensitive capability
  • opencode_runno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_abortno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_childrenno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_createno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_deleteno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_diffno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_forkno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_getno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_initno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_permissionno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_revertno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_searchno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_shareno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_summarizeno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_todono sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_unrevertno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_unshareno sensitive capability
  • opencode_session_updateno sensitive capability
  • opencode_sessions_overviewno sensitive capability
  • opencode_setupno sensitive capability
  • opencode_statusno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tool_idsno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tool_listno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_append_promptno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_clear_promptno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_open_helpno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_open_modelsno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_open_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_open_themesno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_show_toastno sensitive capability
  • opencode_tui_submit_promptno sensitive capability
  • opencode_vcs_infono sensitive capability
  • opencode_waitno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.11.0 latest A 93/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan opencode-mcp --online

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Other implementations of Opencode 5

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →

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