Openchatci — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "openchatci",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "openchatci"
},
"server": {
"name": "openchatci"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 78,
"threatScore": 85,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js:707`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js",
"line": 707,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js:707`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js"
},
"evidence": "dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js",
"line": 707,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js:707`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js"
},
"evidence": "ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js",
"line": 707,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/app/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/cli.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( \"az account show\", capture_output=True, t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/app/cli.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/app/cli/main.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/cli/main.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/cli/main.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( \"az account show\", capture_output=True, text",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/app/cli/main.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/app/coding/tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/coding/tools.py:152`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/coding/tools.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/app/coding/tools.py",
"line": 152,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js:61`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js"
},
"evidence": "t[e.id];try{let n=await import(e.module);return t[e.id]=n,n}catch(n){return console.error(`Error loading route module \\`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/app/_frontend_dist/assets/index-BCDXdbMQ.js",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/app/auth/__init__.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/auth/__init__.py:58`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/auth/__init__.py"
},
"evidence": "ait get_auth_provider().require(request) async def verify_api_key_strict(request: Request) -> Identity: \"\"\"FastAPI",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/app/auth/__init__.py",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/app/auth/provider.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/auth/provider.py:118`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/auth/provider.py"
},
"evidence": "ply return ``await self.require(request)``. \"\"\" name: str async def authenticate(self, request: Request) -",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/app/auth/provider.py",
"line": 118,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"openchatci\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "openchatci"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "submit_job",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "37bd39de0db81be21a4a314fa75932941b7ac73b242714fd63eb548fe0718ee5",
"stats": {
"tools": 5,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}