open-db-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`installer/open-db-mcp.wrapper.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.call(exe, stdin=sys.stdin, stdout=sys.stdout, stderr=sys.stderr) except FileNotFo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server installer/open-db-mcp.wrapper.py
In the server's implementation (`src/open_db_mcp/cli.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: $ {' '.join(cmd)}") subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, cwd=pkg_root) typer.echo("[OK] 打包完成,产物在 dist/") if __name_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/open_db_mcp/cli.py
In the server's implementation (`src/open_db_mcp/parser/secret_resolver.py:119`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( args, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/open_db_mcp/parser/secret_resolver.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_datasourceno sensitive capabilitybegin_transactionno sensitive capabilitycommit_transactionno sensitive capabilitydescribe_tableno sensitive capabilitydiff_schemano sensitive capabilityexecute_ddlno sensitive capabilityexecute_dmlno sensitive capabilityexecute_queryno sensitive capabilityexplain_queryno sensitive capabilityexport_tableno sensitive capabilityget_active_datasourceno sensitive capabilityget_pool_statsno sensitive capabilityget_transaction_statusno sensitive capabilityimport_csvno sensitive capabilitylist_datasourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_driversno sensitive capabilitylist_indexesno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilityping_datasourceno sensitive capabilityremove_datasourceno sensitive capabilityrollback_transactionno sensitive capabilitysample_tableno sensitive capabilityupdate_datasourceno sensitive capabilityuse_datasourceno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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