Onepdf MCP Server
onepdf-mcp-server
npm
v0.4.0
Published by wendongai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
91 trustworthy PDF tools for Claude, Cursor, Codex, and other MCP clients
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/dependencies.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/dependencies.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/dependencies.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/exec-safe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/exec-safe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; /** * Safely execute a command using execFileSync (no shell interpretation) *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/exec-safe.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/process-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/process-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; function appendBounded(current, chunk, maximum) { const currentBytes = Buffe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/process-runner.js
Tools 98
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_page_textingests untrusted inputpage_dimensionsingests untrusted inputadd_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityadd_blank_pageno sensitive capabilityadd_header_footerno sensitive capabilityadd_stampsno sensitive capabilityai_chat_with_pdfno sensitive capabilityai_extract_infono sensitive capabilityai_summarizeno sensitive capabilityalternate_mergeno sensitive capability
Show 88 more tools ↓
background_colorno sensitive capabilitybates_number_pdfno sensitive capabilitybmp_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitycbz_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitychange_permissionsno sensitive capabilitycombine_single_pageno sensitive capabilitycompare_pdfsno sensitive capabilitycompressno sensitive capabilitycrop_pdfno sensitive capabilitydecryptno sensitive capabilitydelete_pagesno sensitive capabilitydeskew_pdfno sensitive capabilitydivide_pagesno sensitive capabilitydjvu_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityedit_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityedit_bookmarksno sensitive capabilityedit_metadatano sensitive capabilityemail_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityencryptno sensitive capabilityepub_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityexcel_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityextract_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityextract_imagesno sensitive capabilityextract_pagesno sensitive capabilityextract_tablesno sensitive capabilityfix_page_sizeno sensitive capabilityflatten_pdfno sensitive capabilityfont_to_outlineno sensitive capabilityform_creatorno sensitive capabilityform_fillerno sensitive capabilityget_pdf_chunksno sensitive capabilitygrid_combineno sensitive capabilityheic_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityimage_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityinvert_colorsno sensitive capabilityjpg_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityjson_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitylinearize_pdfno sensitive capabilitymarkdown_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitymergeno sensitive capabilitymobi_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitynup_pdfno sensitive capabilityocg_managerno sensitive capabilitypage_numberno sensitive capabilitypdf_bookletno sensitive capabilitypdf_readerno sensitive capabilitypdf_searchno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_bmpno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_docxno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_excelno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_greyscaleno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_jpgno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_jsonno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_markdownno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_pdfano sensitive capabilitypdf_to_pngno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_pptno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_tiffno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_webpno sensitive capabilitypdf_to_zipno sensitive capabilitypng_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityposterize_pdfno sensitive capabilitypowerpoint_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitypsd_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityrasterize_pdfno sensitive capabilityredact_pdfno sensitive capabilityremove_annotationsno sensitive capabilityremove_blank_pagesno sensitive capabilityremove_metadatano sensitive capabilityremove_restrictionsno sensitive capabilityrepair_pdfno sensitive capabilityreverse_pagesno sensitive capabilityrotateno sensitive capabilityrtf_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitysanitize_pdfno sensitive capabilitysign_pdfno sensitive capabilitysort_pagesno sensitive capabilitysplitno sensitive capabilitysvg_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitysystem_statusno sensitive capabilitytable_of_contentsno sensitive capabilitytiff_to_pdfno sensitive capabilitytxt_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityview_metadatano sensitive capabilitywatermarkno sensitive capabilitywebp_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityword_to_pdfno sensitive capabilityxps_to_pdfno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (98 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.3.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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