Omv MCP Server
omv-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for managing an OpenMediaVault NAS. Runs ON the NAS; consumed over stdio-over-SSH.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:23`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _DEFAULT_KEY_NAMES = ["id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_rsa"] # ---------------------------------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/omv_mcp/local.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/omv_mcp/local.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ext=input_text) p = subprocess.run( argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/omv_mcp/local.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:281`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e, *args] res = subprocess.run(add, capture_output=True, text=True) if res.returncode != 0 and "already
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_remote_exec.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_remote_exec.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } out = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", "import omv_mcp.config as c; pri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_remote_exec.py
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesystemsreads sensitive dataavailable_updatesno sensitive capabilitycontainer_inspectno sensitive capabilitycontainer_logsno sensitive capabilitycontainer_statsno sensitive capabilitycpu_tempno sensitive capabilitydisk_temperaturesno sensitive capabilitydisk_usageno sensitive capabilitydocker_system_dfno sensitive capabilityget_stack_composeno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
get_system_infono sensitive capabilitylist_block_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_disksno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_networksno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_smb_sharesno sensitive capabilitylist_stacksno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_volumesno sensitive capabilitymemory_infono sensitive capabilitynetwork_infono sensitive capabilitysensors_readoutno sensitive capabilityservice_logsno sensitive capabilityservice_statusno sensitive capabilitysmart_attributesno sensitive capabilitysmart_healthno sensitive capabilitysmart_selftest_logno sensitive capabilitysmart_statusno sensitive capabilitystart_containerno sensitive capabilitystart_stackno sensitive capabilitystorage_summaryno sensitive capabilitytop_processesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan omv-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Files & Storage
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