Omnitrade MCP Server
omnitrade-mcp
npm
v0.9.9
Published by connectry-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { createRequire } from "module"; var _require = createRequire(import.meta
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core-IDBWLFHU.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core-IDBWLFHU.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s import { exec } from "child_process"; async function sendNative(title, message) { const platform = process.platform;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core-IDBWLFHU.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"omnitrade-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package omnitrade-mcp
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cancel_orderno sensitive capabilitycheck_alertsno sensitive capabilitycheck_conditional_ordersno sensitive capabilitycheck_spreadno sensitive capabilityclear_portfolio_historyno sensitive capabilityclear_triggered_alertsno sensitive capabilitycompare_pricesno sensitive capabilityexecute_arbitrageno sensitive capabilityexecute_dca_ordersno sensitive capabilityget_arbitrageno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_balancesno sensitive capabilityget_chartno sensitive capabilityget_ordersno sensitive capabilityget_portfoliono sensitive capabilityget_portfolio_historyno sensitive capabilityget_pricesno sensitive capabilitylist_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_conditional_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_dca_configsno sensitive capabilityplace_orderno sensitive capabilityrebalance_portfoliono sensitive capabilityrecord_portfolio_snapshotno sensitive capabilityremove_alertno sensitive capabilityremove_conditional_orderno sensitive capabilityremove_dcano sensitive capabilityset_conditional_orderno sensitive capabilityset_price_alertno sensitive capabilitysetup_dcano sensitive capabilitytoggle_dcano sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.9 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan omnitrade-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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