Omniplan MCP Server
omniplan-mcp
PyPI
v0.5.0
Published by cygnusyang — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server and CLI for reading and writing OmniPlan (.oplx) and Microsoft Project (.mpp) schedule files
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "evaluate_omniplan_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "evaluate_omniplan_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool evaluate_omniplan_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/omniplan_mcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/omniplan_mcp/cli.py:499`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess result = subprocess.run( ["osascript", "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/omniplan_mcp/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/omniplan_mcp/parser.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/omniplan_mcp/parser.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ailure.""" result = subprocess.run( ["osascript", "-l", "AppleScript", "-e", script], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/omniplan_mcp/parser.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "evaluate_omniplan_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "evaluate_omniplan_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool evaluate_omniplan_script · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "evaluate_omniplan_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "evaluate_omniplan_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool evaluate_omniplan_script
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
evaluate_omniplan_scriptruns code / shelladd_dependencyno sensitive capabilityadd_taskno sensitive capabilityclear_constraint_dateno sensitive capabilityclear_task_constraint_dateno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilityexport_scheduleno sensitive capabilityfind_orphan_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_resource_detailno sensitive capabilityget_schedule_settingsno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
get_task_detailno sensitive capabilitylist_assignmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_violationsno sensitive capabilitylookup_taskno sensitive capabilitymove_taskno sensitive capabilityread_scheduleno sensitive capabilityremove_dependencyno sensitive capabilityrename_taskno sensitive capabilityreorder_taskno sensitive capabilityrepair_orphan_tasksno sensitive capabilitysave_documentno sensitive capabilityschedule_summaryno sensitive capabilitysearch_tasksno sensitive capabilityset_resource_noteno sensitive capabilityset_task_completedno sensitive capabilityset_task_completed_by_nameno sensitive capabilityset_task_constraint_dateno sensitive capabilityset_task_durationno sensitive capabilityset_task_estimateno sensitive capabilityset_task_noteno sensitive capabilityset_task_progressno sensitive capabilityset_task_typeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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