Omnidim Ai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1405`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const factory = new Function('z', `return (${body});`); const schema = factory(z); if (typeof sc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 1405,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1487`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "const factory = new Function('z', `return (${body});`) as (z: any) => z.ZodTypeAny; const schema = facto",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 1487,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/clients.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/clients.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/clients.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/clients.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/clients.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/clients.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/clients.ts"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/clients.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([createAgent]) co-exist with external-action tools ([addBulkCallContact]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "createAgent → addBulkCallContact"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [createAgent] → sinks [addBulkCallContact]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"createAgent"
],
"sinks": [
"addBulkCallContact"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/update_notifier.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/update_notifier.js:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/update_notifier.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE}/latest`, { signal: ctrl.signal }); clearTim",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/update_notifier.js",
"line": 78,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/update_notifier.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/update_notifier.ts:71`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/update_notifier.ts"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE}/latest`, { signal: ctrl.signal }); clearTim",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/update_notifier.ts",
"line": 71,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"createAgent"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"addBulkCallContact"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "createSession",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listAgents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "createAgent",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "getAgent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "updateAgent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deleteAgent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listAgentVersions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "createAgentVersion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deleteAgentVersion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "renameAgentVersion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "diffAgentVersion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restoreAgentVersion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatchCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listCallLogs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getCallLog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetchBulkCalls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "createBulkCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "addBulkCallContact",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "getBulkCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulkCallActions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancelBulkCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listBulkCallLines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listBulkCallNumbers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "addBulkCallNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setBulkCallNumberActive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "addBulkCallContacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "startBulkCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setBulkCallConcurrency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retryBulkCall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setBulkCallDailyTimeControl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getBulkCallLiveStatus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listKnowledgeBaseFiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "canUploadFile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "uploadKnowledgeBaseFile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attachKnowledgeBaseFiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detachKnowledgeBaseFiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deleteKnowledgeBaseFile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listPhoneNumbers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "searchPhoneNumbers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "purchasePhoneNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "releasePhoneNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attachPhoneNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detachPhoneNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importTwilioNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importExotelNumber",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "importSipTrunk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listLLMProviders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listVoices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listSTTProviders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listTTSProviders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "listAllProviders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "getVoice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0ad6b0bb7cd7eb353aa8516815368dd7fd8b31c94fd257b23acb0f90999d0801",
"stats": {
"tools": 52,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}