Omnidim Ai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 6.66,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 3.6
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 1.8
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.9
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.36
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1062`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "new Function(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 1062
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1144`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "new Function(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 1144
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/clients.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/clients.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/clients.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/clients.js",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/clients.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/clients.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/clients.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/clients.ts",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/update_notifier.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/update_notifier.js:78`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/update_notifier.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE}/latest`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/update_notifier.js",
"line": 78
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/update_notifier.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/update_notifier.ts:71`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/update_notifier.ts"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE}/latest`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/update_notifier.ts",
"line": 71
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@omnidim-ai/mcp-server\" is \"mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"target": "mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @playwright/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@omnidim-ai/mcp-server\" is \"@playwright/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@playwright/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"target": "@playwright/mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @stripe/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@omnidim-ai/mcp-server\" is \"@stripe/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@stripe/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"target": "@stripe/mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-006",
"title": "Possible combosquat of @browsermcp/mcp",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@omnidim-ai/mcp-server\" is \"@browsermcp/mcp\" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.",
"remediation": "Confirm you meant \"@browsermcp/mcp\". Install packages only from their documented, official name.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"candidate": "@omnidim-ai/mcp-server",
"target": "@browsermcp/mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "2df480fbc146a298d01e151b235daa35ed005a6c878e925e4a38855a65044d98",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 6,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}