Ofw MCP Server
ofw-mcp
npm
v2.7.0
Source verified
Published by chrischall — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:2953`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ofw_download_attachment, ofw_check_freshness, ofw_get_notifications]) co-exist with external-action tools ([ofw_send_message, ofw_upload_attachment]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ofw_download_attachment, ofw_check_freshness, ofw_get_notifications] → sinks [ofw_send_message, ofw_upload_attachment]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ofw_download_attachment → ofw_send_message
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ofw_check_freshnessingests untrusted inputofw_download_attachmentingests untrusted inputofw_get_notificationsingests untrusted inputofw_send_messagenetwork egressofw_upload_attachmentnetwork egressofw_create_eventno sensitive capabilityofw_create_expenseno sensitive capabilityofw_create_journal_entryno sensitive capabilityofw_delete_draftno sensitive capabilityofw_delete_eventno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
ofw_get_expense_totalsno sensitive capabilityofw_get_messageno sensitive capabilityofw_get_profileno sensitive capabilityofw_get_unread_sentno sensitive capabilityofw_list_draftsno sensitive capabilityofw_list_eventsno sensitive capabilityofw_list_expensesno sensitive capabilityofw_list_journal_entriesno sensitive capabilityofw_list_message_foldersno sensitive capabilityofw_list_messagesno sensitive capabilityofw_save_draftno sensitive capabilityofw_sync_messagesno sensitive capabilityofw_update_eventno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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