Odooforge MCP Server
odooforge
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by hamzatrq — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI-First ERP Configuration Engine for Odoo 18 — CLI toolkit + MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verify_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify_release.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v0.1.2+) process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verify_release.py
Tools 79
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
odoo_db_backupreads sensitive dataodoo_db_run_sqlreads sensitive dataodoo_analyze_requirementsno sensitive capabilityodoo_automation_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_automation_deleteno sensitive capabilityodoo_automation_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_automation_updateno sensitive capabilityodoo_company_configureno sensitive capabilityodoo_create_dashboardno sensitive capabilityodoo_create_featureno sensitive capability
Show 69 more tools ↓
odoo_db_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_db_dropno sensitive capabilityodoo_db_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_db_restoreno sensitive capabilityodoo_design_solutionno sensitive capabilityodoo_diagnostics_health_checkno sensitive capabilityodoo_email_configure_incomingno sensitive capabilityodoo_email_configure_outgoingno sensitive capabilityodoo_email_dns_guideno sensitive capabilityodoo_email_template_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_email_testno sensitive capabilityodoo_generate_addonno sensitive capabilityodoo_import_executeno sensitive capabilityodoo_import_previewno sensitive capabilityodoo_import_templateno sensitive capabilityodoo_instance_logsno sensitive capabilityodoo_instance_restartno sensitive capabilityodoo_instance_startno sensitive capabilityodoo_instance_statusno sensitive capabilityodoo_instance_stopno sensitive capabilityodoo_knowledge_community_gapsno sensitive capabilityodoo_knowledge_module_infono sensitive capabilityodoo_knowledge_searchno sensitive capabilityodoo_model_fieldsno sensitive capabilityodoo_model_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_model_search_fieldno sensitive capabilityodoo_module_infono sensitive capabilityodoo_module_installno sensitive capabilityodoo_module_list_availableno sensitive capabilityodoo_module_list_installedno sensitive capabilityodoo_module_uninstallno sensitive capabilityodoo_module_upgradeno sensitive capabilityodoo_network_exposeno sensitive capabilityodoo_network_statusno sensitive capabilityodoo_network_stopno sensitive capabilityodoo_recipe_executeno sensitive capabilityodoo_recipe_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_deleteno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_executeno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_readno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_searchno sensitive capabilityodoo_record_updateno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_get_templateno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_layout_configureno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_modifyno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_previewno sensitive capabilityodoo_report_resetno sensitive capabilityodoo_schema_field_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_schema_field_deleteno sensitive capabilityodoo_schema_field_updateno sensitive capabilityodoo_schema_list_customno sensitive capabilityodoo_schema_model_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_settings_getno sensitive capabilityodoo_settings_setno sensitive capabilityodoo_setup_businessno sensitive capabilityodoo_setup_integrationno sensitive capabilityodoo_snapshot_createno sensitive capabilityodoo_snapshot_deleteno sensitive capabilityodoo_snapshot_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_snapshot_restoreno sensitive capabilityodoo_users_manageno sensitive capabilityodoo_validate_planno sensitive capabilityodoo_view_get_archno sensitive capabilityodoo_view_listno sensitive capabilityodoo_view_list_customizationsno sensitive capabilityodoo_view_modifyno sensitive capabilityodoo_view_resetno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (79 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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