Odoo Sh — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "odoo-sh-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "odoo-sh-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "odoo-sh-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/odoo_sh_mcp/server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/odoo_sh_mcp/server.py:564`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/odoo_sh_mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "OO_SH_SSH_KEY\", \"~/.ssh/id_ed25519\") if not ssh_host or not ssh_user: raise ValueError(\"ODOO_SH_SSH_",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/odoo_sh_mcp/server.py",
"line": 564,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name, parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"ssh_exec\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ssh.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ssh.py:16`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_ssh.py"
},
"evidence": "= \"12345\" KEY = \"~/.ssh/id_ed25519\" def make_proc(returncode=0, stdout=\"\", stderr=\"\"): proc = MagicMock() proc",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_ssh.py",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/odoo_sh_mcp/tools/ssh.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/odoo_sh_mcp/tools/ssh.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/odoo_sh_mcp/tools/ssh.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120) except subprocess.TimeoutE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/odoo_sh_mcp/tools/ssh.py",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_model_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_model_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_views",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_view_by_xmlid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_field_in_view",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scaffold_module",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_model_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_view_inheritance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name",
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_read_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_modules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "install_module",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upgrade_module",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_server_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "e6a7ed969a8c7d5e3e4193fcedd4fa3ebba2a5b2c16eae367ffb6401e86142ca",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}