Odoo Pulse MCP Server
odoo-pulse
PyPI
v1.9.1
Published by minhhq-a1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI business analyst for Odoo ERP (18+) — one-call reports with verdicts, over MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/contract/test_mcp_surface.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/contract/test_mcp_surface.py:217`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] = groups result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", PROBE], check=True, capture_outpu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/contract/test_mcp_surface.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/contract/test_metadata.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/contract/test_metadata.py:54`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: check=True): return subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts/release/sy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/contract/test_metadata.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/contract/test_release_contract.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/contract/test_release_contract.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h / "github-output" subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), "iden
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/contract/test_release_contract.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/contract/test_repository_hygiene.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/contract/test_repository_hygiene.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ive}" ignored = subprocess.run( ["git", "check-ignore", "-q", relative], cwd=ROOT )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/contract/test_repository_hygiene.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/contract/test_smithery_publish.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/contract/test_smithery_publish.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tomli_shim) return subprocess.run( ["bash", str(script)], cwd=repo, env=env, captur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/contract/test_smithery_publish.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_package_startup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_package_startup.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "PYTHONPATH", None) subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", STARTUP_PROBE], check=True, cwd=t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_package_startup.py
Tools 88
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_invoiceingests untrusted inputget_purchase_orderingests untrusted inputget_sale_orderingests untrusted inputread_recordsingests untrusted inputabsence_overviewno sensitive capabilityaggregate_recordsno sensitive capabilitybusiness_pulseno sensitive capabilitycheck_stockno sensitive capabilityconfirm_sale_orderno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capability
Show 78 more tools ↓
create_leadno sensitive capabilitycreate_recordno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_recordsno sensitive capabilityfind_partnerno sensitive capabilityfind_productsno sensitive capabilityget_model_fieldsno sensitive capabilityinventory_riskno sensitive capabilitylist_activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_applicantsno sensitive capabilitylist_appraisalsno sensitive capabilitylist_approval_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_attendancesno sensitive capabilitylist_bomsno sensitive capabilitylist_calendar_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_coursesno sensitive capabilitylist_departmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_email_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_employeesno sensitive capabilitylist_engineering_changesno sensitive capabilitylist_equipmentno sensitive capabilitylist_event_registrationsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_expensesno sensitive capabilitylist_helpdesk_ticketsno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_iot_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_job_positionsno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_articlesno sensitive capabilitylist_loyalty_cardsno sensitive capabilitylist_loyalty_programsno sensitive capabilitylist_lunch_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_maintenance_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_manufacturing_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_membershipsno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_paymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_payslipsno sensitive capabilitylist_pickingsno sensitive capabilitylist_planning_slotsno sensitive capabilitylist_pos_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_pos_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_purchase_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_quality_alertsno sensitive capabilitylist_quality_checksno sensitive capabilitylist_repair_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_sale_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_sign_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_social_postsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_surveysno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_time_offno sensitive capabilitylist_timesheetsno sensitive capabilitylist_vehiclesno sensitive capabilitylist_website_visitorsno sensitive capabilityodoo_versionno sensitive capabilitypipeline_reviewno sensitive capabilityportfolio_healthno sensitive capabilityprocurement_watchno sensitive capabilityproduction_healthno sensitive capabilityproject_budgetno sensitive capabilityproject_dashboardno sensitive capabilityproject_profitabilityno sensitive capabilityproject_status_reportno sensitive capabilityproject_subtask_hoursno sensitive capabilityread_attachmentno sensitive capabilityreceivables_healthno sensitive capabilitysales_snapshotno sensitive capabilitysearch_countno sensitive capabilitysearch_readno sensitive capabilitystandup_digestno sensitive capabilityteam_workloadno sensitive capabilityupdate_recordsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (88 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.9.0 |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.8.2 |
A 96/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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