Octopoda — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "octopoda",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "octopoda"
},
"server": {
"name": "octopoda"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js:4060`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js"
},
"evidence": "{let t=ov(s,e),{Body:n}=new Function(t)();return n}function ov(s,e){return` ${lv(s,e)} ${av(s)} return {Body: Body, V",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js",
"line": 4060,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js:4060`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js"
},
"evidence": "{let t=ov(s,e),{Body:n}=new Function(t)();return n}function ov(s,e){return` ${lv(s,e)} ${av(s)} return {Body: Body, V",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/NeuralGraph-JivWmplo.js",
"line": 4060,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js:6193`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js"
},
"evidence": "}\\r result = eval(expression, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, allowed_names)\\r return str(result)\\r excep",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js",
"line": 6193,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "ct = {} exec(code, self._safe_globals(), ns) # noqa: S102 - sandboxed; see docstring bo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py",
"line": 80,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (synrix/engine.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix/engine.py:183`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix/engine.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [str(engine_path), \"--version\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "synrix/engine.py",
"line": 183,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js:10404`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js"
},
"evidence": "s\\r store_result = subprocess.run(\\r [sys.executable, \"-c\", \"\"\"\\r from octopoda import AgentRuntime\\r ag",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js",
"line": 10404,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (synrix_runtime/loop_intel_v2/circuit_breaker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/loop_intel_v2/circuit_breaker.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/loop_intel_v2/circuit_breaker.py"
},
"evidence": "} try: subprocess.run( [\"curl\", \"-s\", \"-X\", \"POST\", \"https://api.resend.com/emails\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "synrix_runtime/loop_intel_v2/circuit_breaker.py",
"line": 73,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([octopoda_read_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([octopoda_send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "octopoda_read_messages → octopoda_send_message"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [octopoda_read_messages] → sinks [octopoda_send_message]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"octopoda_read_messages"
],
"sinks": [
"octopoda_send_message"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (synrix/fact_extractor.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix/fact_extractor.py:409`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix/fact_extractor.py"
},
"evidence": "ry: resp = requests.post( \"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", header",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "synrix/fact_extractor.py",
"line": 409,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (synrix_runtime/api/cloud_server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/api/cloud_server.py:3486`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/api/cloud_server.py"
},
"evidence": "ode.js): await fetch(\"https://api.octopoda.dev/v1/ingest\", { method: \"POST\", headers:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "synrix_runtime/api/cloud_server.py",
"line": 3486,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js:24982`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js"
},
"evidence": "`const response = await fetch(\"https://api.octopodas.com/v1/agents/my_agent/remember\", { method: \"POST\", headers:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "synrix_runtime/dashboard/static/assets/index-DTLPD_iM.js",
"line": 24982,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py:60`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py"
},
"evidence": "he sandbox\") return __import__(name, *args, **kwargs) class RestrictedSandbox: \"\"\"Dev/benchmark sandbox. See m",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "octopoda_zf/active/sandbox.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (octopoda_zf/instrument/autogen_hook.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`octopoda_zf/instrument/autogen_hook.py:88`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "octopoda_zf/instrument/autogen_hook.py"
},
"evidence": "try: mod = __import__(path, fromlist=[\"BaseGroupChat\"]) base_group_chat = getattr(mod, \"BaseGro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "octopoda_zf/instrument/autogen_hook.py",
"line": 88,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_full_system.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_full_system.py:350`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_full_system.py"
},
"evidence": "ps_redirect(): r = requests.get(\"http://octopodas.com\", timeout=10, allow_redirects=False) return r.status_cod",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_full_system.py",
"line": 350,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_full_system.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_full_system.py:230`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_full_system.py"
},
"evidence": "import(): result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", \"from octopoda import AgentRuntime; print('OK')\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_full_system.py",
"line": 230,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"octopoda_read_messages"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"octopoda_send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "octopoda_remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_recall_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_recall_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_read_shared",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_agent_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_process_conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_log_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_forget",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_forget_stale",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_memory_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_consolidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_loop_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_loop_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_read_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_broadcast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_set_goal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_get_goal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_update_progress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_search_filtered",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "octopoda_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "452be3b15e2bc635cd7f34fe3e5645b518f3a8230c04c9aa54b0793e05ac90ad",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 6,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}