Haloscan MCP Server
@occirank/haloscan-server
npm
v2.0.21
Published by @occirank — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Haloscan SEO API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; // Initialize dotenv dotenv.config(); // Get packag
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.ts
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_page_best_keywordsingests untrusted inputget_domains_bulkno sensitive capabilityget_domains_competitorsno sensitive capabilityget_domains_competitors_best_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_domains_competitors_keywords_best_posno sensitive capabilityget_domains_competitors_keywords_diffno sensitive capabilityget_domains_expiredno sensitive capabilityget_domains_expired_revealno sensitive capabilityget_domains_gmb_backlinksno sensitive capabilityget_domains_gmb_backlinks_categoriesno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
get_domains_gmb_backlinks_mapno sensitive capabilityget_domains_history_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_domains_history_positionsno sensitive capabilityget_domains_keywordsno sensitive capabilityget_domains_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_domains_positionsno sensitive capabilityget_domains_top_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_domains_visibility_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_bulkno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_findno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_highlightsno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_matchno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_questionsno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_relatedno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_scrapno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_serp_availableDatesno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_serp_compareno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_serp_pageEvolutionno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_similarno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_site_structureno sensitive capabilityget_keywords_synonymsno sensitive capabilityget_user_creditno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.21 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @occirank/haloscan-server --onlineMore in Marketing & Social
Official Abyssfall game info, newsletter double opt-in, and merch reservation tools.
AdCritter ads platform: docs, API reference, app scaffolding, and white-label integration.
Google AdSense MCP Server - Monitor earnings, reports, and account health via Claude/AI
Operational empathy for technical founders + PE/VC operators navigating high-stakes B2B interactions. 28 MCP tools + CLI: ICP scoring, persona simulation, battlecards, deal classification, prospect discovery, investor matching, founder wellness, plus mark
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools — SEO site management, URL submission, sitemaps, stats, keywords
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that helps AI agents use Primer Brand (@primer/react-brand) correctly when building GitHub marketing and landing pages.