Obsidian Vaultgate MCP Server
obsidian-vaultgate-mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Source verified
Published by mkemeter — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Connect your Obsidian vault to any AI assistant — zero plugins, full privacy. An MCP server powered by the official Obsidian CLI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { config } from "./config.js"; con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/installer.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import * as path from "node:path"; import * as url from "node:url"; /** * Resol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/uri.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/uri.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { config } from "./config.js"; con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/uri.js
low Mutating tool "eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"obsidian-vaultgate-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: lefthook install
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package obsidian-vaultgate-mcp
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
evalruns code / shellbacklinksno sensitive capabilityclear_indexno sensitive capabilitydaily_appendno sensitive capabilitydaily_openno sensitive capabilitydaily_readno sensitive capabilitydev_consoleno sensitive capabilitydev_cssno sensitive capabilitydev_domno sensitive capabilitydev_errorsno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
dev_mobileno sensitive capabilitydev_screenshotno sensitive capabilityfiles_listno sensitive capabilityfiles_readno sensitive capabilityfind_similarno sensitive capabilityindex_vaultno sensitive capabilitynote_appendno sensitive capabilitynote_createno sensitive capabilitynote_openno sensitive capabilitynote_prependno sensitive capabilitynote_trashno sensitive capabilitynote_updateno sensitive capabilityplugin_reloadno sensitive capabilityplugins_listno sensitive capabilityproperty_readno sensitive capabilityproperty_setno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_openno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitytagsno sensitive capabilitytasks_allno sensitive capabilitytasks_dailyno sensitive capabilitytasks_pendingno sensitive capabilitytemplates_applyno sensitive capabilitytemplates_listno sensitive capabilityunresolvedno sensitive capabilityvault_contextno sensitive capabilityvault_context_setno sensitive capabilityvault_infono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v0.2.7 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.2.6 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.2.5 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.2.4 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.2.3 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v0.2.2 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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