Obsidian Everywhere MCP Server
obsidian-everywhere
npm
v0.9.2
Source verified
Published by junnnnnw00 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Graph-native MCP server for searching, navigating, and safely editing Obsidian vaults from any MCP client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/git/vault-git.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/git/vault-git.js:157`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t(base) || /^(?:id_rsa|id_dsa|id_ecdsa|id_ed25519)(?:\.|$)/i.test(base) || /\.(?:pem|key|p8|p12|pfx|keys
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git/vault-git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-commands.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-commands.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { normalizeGitRep
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-commands.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git/vault-git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git/vault-git.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, realpathSyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git/vault-git.js
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
git_statusingests untrusted inputread_filereads sensitive dataadd_tagsno sensitive capabilityappend_to_noteno sensitive capabilityapply_templateno sensitive capabilitybulk_remove_frontmatter_fieldno sensitive capabilitybulk_replaceno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_frontmatterno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
find_orphansno sensitive capabilityfind_pathno sensitive capabilityfind_unresolvedno sensitive capabilityget_backlinksno sensitive capabilityget_context_bundleno sensitive capabilityget_hotkeysno sensitive capabilityget_neighborhoodno sensitive capabilityget_notes_by_tagno sensitive capabilityget_obsidian_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_relatedno sensitive capabilitygit_commitno sensitive capabilitygit_diffno sensitive capabilitygit_logno sensitive capabilitygit_pushno sensitive capabilitylist_folderno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitymove_noteno sensitive capabilitypatch_sectionno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityregex_searchno sensitive capabilityremove_frontmatter_fieldno sensitive capabilityremove_tagsno sensitive capabilityrename_noteno sensitive capabilityrename_tagno sensitive capabilityreplace_textno sensitive capabilityrollback_bulk_editno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilityset_hotkeyno sensitive capabilityset_templates_folderno sensitive capabilityupdate_frontmatterno sensitive capabilityvalidate_baseno sensitive capabilityvault_overviewno sensitive capabilityvault_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.1 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.8.1 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.7.0 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.6.0 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v0.3.5 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.3.4 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.3.2 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.3.0 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan obsidian-everywhere --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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