Obscura MCP Server
obscura-mcp
npm
v0.1.4-2
Published by metadrama — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server adapter for Obscura headless browser - high-performance web scraping with anti-detection
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Tool "browse_page" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "browse_page" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "eval"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool browse_page
high Tool "browse_scrape" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "browse_scrape" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "eval"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool browse_scrape
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const http = require("http"); const path = require("p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-suite.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-suite.mjs:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-suite.mjs
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([browse_page, browse_interact, browse_session, browse_scrape]) co-exist with external-action tools ([browse_page, browse_scrape]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [browse_page, browse_interact, browse_session, browse_scrape] → sinks [browse_page, browse_scrape]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow browse_page → browse_page
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browse_page"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browse_page" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browse_page · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browse_interact"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browse_interact" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browse_interact · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browse_session"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browse_session" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browse_session · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained command parameter "eval" on "browse_page"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "browse_page" takes a command-shaped parameter "eval" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool browse_page · inputSchema.properties.eval
medium Unconstrained command parameter "eval" on "browse_scrape"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "browse_scrape" takes a command-shaped parameter "eval" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool browse_scrape · inputSchema.properties.eval
low Mutating tool "browse_page" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "browse_page" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool browse_page
low Mutating tool "browse_scrape" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "browse_scrape" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool browse_scrape
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/obscura-bin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/obscura-bin.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); const binaryName = pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/obscura-bin.js
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_pageingests untrusted inputruns code / shellbrowse_scrapeingests untrusted inputruns code / shellbrowse_interactingests untrusted inputbrowse_sessioningests untrusted input
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4-2 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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