Oath MCP Server
oath-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.3
Published by gharsallahdev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/oath/mcp/tools/enumerate_credential_artifacts.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/oath/mcp/tools/enumerate_credential_artifacts.py:69`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/oath/mcp/tools/enumerate_credential_artifacts.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/unit/test_enumerate_credential_artifacts.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`tests/unit/test_enumerate_credential_artifacts.py:85`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_enumerate_credential_artifacts.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/oath/mcp/evidence_handle.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/oath/mcp/evidence_handle.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/oath/mcp/evidence_handle.py
low Unconstrained path parameter "image_path" on "oath_mount"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "oath_mount" takes a path parameter "image_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool oath_mount · inputSchema.properties.image_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "evtx_path" on "parse_evtx"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_evtx" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_evtx · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "mft_path" on "parse_mft"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_mft" takes a path parameter "mft_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_mft · inputSchema.properties.mft_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filter_path" on "parse_mft"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_mft" takes a path parameter "filter_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_mft · inputSchema.properties.filter_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "amcache_path" on "parse_amcache"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_amcache" takes a path parameter "amcache_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_amcache · inputSchema.properties.amcache_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "hive_path" on "parse_registry"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_registry" takes a path parameter "hive_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_registry · inputSchema.properties.hive_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "plugins_dir" on "parse_registry"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_registry" takes a path parameter "plugins_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_registry · inputSchema.properties.plugins_dir
low Unconstrained path parameter "j_path" on "parse_usnjrnl"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_usnjrnl" takes a path parameter "j_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_usnjrnl · inputSchema.properties.j_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filter_path" on "parse_usnjrnl"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_usnjrnl" takes a path parameter "filter_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_usnjrnl · inputSchema.properties.filter_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "plaso_path" on "plaso_supertimeline"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "plaso_supertimeline" takes a path parameter "plaso_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool plaso_supertimeline · inputSchema.properties.plaso_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "memdump_path" on "vol3_query"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "vol3_query" takes a path parameter "memdump_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool vol3_query · inputSchema.properties.memdump_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "evtx_path" on "oath_verify_claim"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "oath_verify_claim" takes a path parameter "evtx_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool oath_verify_claim · inputSchema.properties.evtx_path
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/oath/mcp/tools/find_strings_on_image.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/oath/mcp/tools/find_strings_on_image.py:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/oath/mcp/tools/find_strings_on_image.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/oath/mcp/tools/parse_evtx.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/oath/mcp/tools/parse_evtx.py:135`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/oath/mcp/tools/parse_evtx.py
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
oath_mountreads sensitive dataoath_read_envelopereads sensitive dataoath_verify_claimreads sensitive dataparse_amcachereads sensitive dataparse_evtxreads sensitive dataparse_mftreads sensitive dataparse_registryreads sensitive dataparse_usnjrnlreads sensitive dataplaso_supertimelinereads sensitive datavol3_queryreads sensitive dataenumerate_credential_artifactsno sensitive capabilityfind_strings_on_imageno sensitive capabilityoath_list_envelopesno sensitive capabilityoath_list_handlesno sensitive capabilityparse_prefetchno sensitive capabilityrun_hayabusano sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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