Oasyce Sdk MCP Server
oasyce-sdk
PyPI
v0.13.0
Published by shangri-la-0428 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (oasyce_sdk/agent/daemon.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`oasyce_sdk/agent/daemon.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-o", "command=", "-p", str(pid)], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server oasyce_sdk/agent/daemon.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (oasyce_sdk/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`oasyce_sdk/cli.py:144`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lse) -> str: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=capture_output, text=True, c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server oasyce_sdk/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (oasyce_sdk/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`oasyce_sdk/mcp_server.py:1004`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: es allowed per delegate exec (0 = chain default) expiration_seconds: Policy expiration in seconds (0 = no expiry
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server oasyce_sdk/mcp_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/e2e_testnet.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/e2e_testnet.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gs) + [KB] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) if result.returncode != 0 an
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/e2e_testnet.py
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_marketplaceingests untrusted inputanchor_traceno sensitive capabilitybond_sigilsno sensitive capabilitybuy_data_sharesno sensitive capabilitycheck_anchorno sensitive capabilityclaim_invocationno sensitive capabilitycomplete_invocationno sensitive capabilitycreate_sigilno sensitive capabilitycreate_walletno sensitive capabilitydispute_invocationno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
dissolve_sigilno sensitive capabilityeconomic_snapshotno sensitive capabilityenroll_delegateno sensitive capabilityestimate_action_costno sensitive capabilityfork_sigilno sensitive capabilityget_active_sigil_countno sensitive capabilityget_agent_profileno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_delegate_policyno sensitive capabilityget_delegate_spendno sensitive capabilityget_faucet_tokensno sensitive capabilityget_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityget_my_addressno sensitive capabilityget_principalno sensitive capabilityget_reputationno sensitive capabilityget_sigilno sensitive capabilityget_sigil_bondsno sensitive capabilityget_sigil_lineageno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilityinvoke_capabilityno sensitive capabilitylist_anchors_by_capabilityno sensitive capabilitylist_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_data_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_delegatesno sensitive capabilitylist_open_tasksno sensitive capabilityportfolio_viewno sensitive capabilityregister_capabilityno sensitive capabilityregister_data_assetno sensitive capabilityregister_executorno sensitive capabilityreport_issueno sensitive capabilityrevoke_delegateno sensitive capabilityself_registerno sensitive capabilitysell_data_sharesno sensitive capabilitysend_tokensno sensitive capabilityset_delegate_policyno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitywork_opportunitiesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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