Mina (o1-labs) MCP Server
@o1-labs/mina-mcp-server
npm
v0.7.3
Source verified
Published by minaprotocol — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Mina Protocol daemon and archive node
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/snapshots/capture.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/snapshots/capture.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { createMinaClient }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/snapshots/capture.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/snapshots/capture.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/snapshots/capture.js:89`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rd }; try { execSync(`pg_dump -h ${opts.dbHost} -p ${opts.dbPort} -U ${opts.dbUser} -d ${opts.dbName} --no-o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/snapshots/capture.js
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
describe_stateno sensitive capabilityfaucetno sensitive capabilityfreeze_resetno sensitive capabilityfreeze_statusno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_actionsno sensitive capabilityget_archive_blocksno sensitive capabilityget_archive_schemano sensitive capabilityget_archive_statsno sensitive capabilityget_best_chainno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
get_blockno sensitive capabilityget_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_exampleno sensitive capabilityget_genesis_constantsno sensitive capabilityget_mempoolno sensitive capabilityget_network_idno sensitive capabilityget_network_stateno sensitive capabilityget_staking_ledgerno sensitive capabilityget_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityget_tracked_accountsno sensitive capabilityget_transactionno sensitive capabilityget_transaction_statusno sensitive capabilityget_upgrade_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_blocksno sensitive capabilitylist_examplesno sensitive capabilitylist_walletsno sensitive capabilityquery_archive_sqlno sensitive capabilityreset_sessionno sensitive capabilityreturn_accountno sensitive capabilityrosetta_accountno sensitive capabilityrosetta_blockno sensitive capabilityrosetta_mempoolno sensitive capabilityrosetta_mempool_transactionno sensitive capabilityrosetta_statusno sensitive capabilitysearch_transactionsno sensitive capabilitysend_delegationno sensitive capabilitysend_paymentno sensitive capabilityunfreeze_resetno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.3 latest |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @o1-labs/mina-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Mina 1
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