Nyx Intelligence Val MCP Server
@nyx-intelligence/val-mcp
npm
v0.12.0
Published by @nyx-intelligence — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Val: a 100% MCP QA agent for vibecoders. Drives a real browser to catch UX bugs (broken links, 404s, console errors, broken images) so your coding agent can fix them.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/github.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/github.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; // We use execFile (no shell), so each ar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/github.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([val_scan_devices, val_scan]) co-exist with external-action tools ([val_capture_network]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [val_scan_devices, val_scan] → sinks [val_capture_network]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow val_scan_devices → val_capture_network
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "val_scan_devices"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "val_scan_devices" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool val_scan_devices · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "val_scan"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "val_scan" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool val_scan · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "val_capture_network"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "val_capture_network" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool val_capture_network · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
val_capture_networknetwork egressval_scaningests untrusted inputval_scan_devicesingests untrusted inputval_a11y_auditno sensitive capabilityval_actno sensitive capabilityval_checkno sensitive capabilityval_checkoutno sensitive capabilityval_clickno sensitive capabilityval_closeno sensitive capabilityval_compareno sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
val_consoleno sensitive capabilityval_dedupeno sensitive capabilityval_describeno sensitive capabilityval_detect_paywallno sensitive capabilityval_exerciseno sensitive capabilityval_exercise_formsno sensitive capabilityval_file_findingno sensitive capabilityval_invariantsno sensitive capabilityval_lighthouseno sensitive capabilityval_loginno sensitive capabilityval_openno sensitive capabilityval_pay_stripe_testno sensitive capabilityval_pr_contextno sensitive capabilityval_reviewno sensitive capabilityval_screenshotno sensitive capabilityval_snapshotno sensitive capabilityval_stateno sensitive capabilityval_typeno sensitive capabilityval_verify_fixno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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