Noyrax MCP Server
@noyrax/mcp-server
npm
v1.0.4-beta.41
Published by @noyrax — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Unified MCP Server for Noyrax Workspace - Orchestrates 5D Database Plugin and Documentation System Plugin. Provides Model Context Protocol (MCP) access for AI agents (Cursor, VS Code, Claude Desktop).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/plugins/database-plugin-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/plugins/database-plugin-adapter.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; /** * Adapter for 5D Database Plugin APIs. * Provides access to database funct
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/plugins/database-plugin-adapter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/plugins/documentation-plugin-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/plugins/documentation-plugin-adapter.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { createRequire } from 'module'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/plugins/documentation-plugin-adapter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/tools/database-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/tools/database-tools.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Data
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/tools/database-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/tools/drift-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/tools/drift-tools.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises'; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/tools/drift-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (out/tools/path-alias-healing.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`out/tools/path-alias-healing.js:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server out/tools/path-alias-healing.js
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
source_snippetingests untrusted inputadr_generatorno sensitive capabilityarchitecture_miningno sensitive capabilitybootstrapno sensitive capabilitycheck_docs_statusno sensitive capabilitycross_analysisno sensitive capabilityexplain_toolsno sensitive capabilityexport_snapshotno sensitive capabilitygap_analysisno sensitive capabilitygenerate_adrno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
generate_documentationno sensitive capabilityimport_snapshotno sensitive capabilitylearning_pathno sensitive capabilityonboarding_reportno sensitive capabilityquery_adrsno sensitive capabilityquery_changesno sensitive capabilityquery_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityquery_modulesno sensitive capabilityquery_symbolsno sensitive capabilitysemantic_discoveryno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_getno sensitive capabilitysource_access_contractno sensitive capabilitysystem_contractno sensitive capabilitysystem_explanationno sensitive capabilitytools_manifestno sensitive capabilityvalidation_analyzeImpactno sensitive capabilityvalidation_runDriftCheckno sensitive capabilityvalidation_runScanno sensitive capabilityvalidation_runValidateno sensitive capabilityvalidation_verifyAdrsno sensitive capabilityvector_backend_healthcheckno sensitive capabilityvector_backend_statusno sensitive capabilityworkflow_autonomous_documentationno sensitive capabilityworkflow_autonomous_featureno sensitive capabilityworkflow_autonomous_refactoringno sensitive capabilityworkflow_boundary_reportno sensitive capabilityworkflow_check_statusno sensitive capabilityworkflow_co_partner_feedbackno sensitive capabilityworkflow_co_partner_planno sensitive capabilityworkflow_co_partner_rollbackno sensitive capabilityworkflow_ensure_readyno sensitive capabilityworkflow_full_cycleno sensitive capabilityworkflow_generate_and_ingestno sensitive capabilityworkflow_ingestno sensitive capabilityworkflow_onboardno sensitive capabilityworkflow_path_alias_healingno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.4-beta.41 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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