Notion Mpm — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "notion-mpm",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "notion-mpm"
},
"server": {
"name": "notion-mpm"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_page → query_database ⇒ create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_page → query_database → create_comment"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_page",
"get_page_property"
],
"sources": [
"query_database"
],
"sinks": [
"create_comment"
],
"path": [
"get_page",
"query_database",
"create_comment"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_page",
"to": "query_database",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "query_database",
"to": "create_comment",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/notion_mpm/cli/main.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/notion_mpm/cli/main.py:99`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/notion_mpm/cli/main.py"
},
"evidence": "__import__(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/notion_mpm/cli/main.py",
"line": 99
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"notion-mpm\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "notion-mpm"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"notion-mpm\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "notion-mpm"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_page",
"get_page_property"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"query_database"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_comment"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_page",
"query_database",
"create_comment"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_page → query_database ⇒ create_comment."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_property",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_block_children",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "append_block_children",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_database",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_database",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"query database\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_bot_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_comment",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_comment\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0d9d5db13ed8d7b2d5932c2f8a09998ec32708cb3294c995e55d05dbc55b9366",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}