Notion (snickery) MCP Server

notion-mcp PyPI v0.1.0

Published by snickery — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Notion: pages, databases, markdown, comments, and a full file pipeline

Trust grade
F
58/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
F · 58/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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F Why this grade threat 69 − adoption risk = 58/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 31.5 = 69. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−31.5 Self-contained exfiltration primitive: "notion_download_file" MTC-FLOW-001 exfiltration

2. Client adoption risk — 69 − 11 = 58. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Grade capped: a critical finding is present → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

critical Self-contained exfiltration primitive: "notion_download_file"MTC-FLOW-001

Tool "notion_download_file" holds all three trifecta roles by itself (untrusted-input + sensitive-source + external-sink). A single call can pull attacker-controlled content, read private data, and exfiltrate it — no composition required.

Fix: Split responsibilities across separate, individually-consented tools; never combine untrusted input, secret reads, and egress in one tool.

Location: flow notion_download_file

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "notion_search_pages"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "notion_search_pages" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow notion_search_pages

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "notion_describe_database"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "notion_describe_database" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow notion_describe_database

Tools 44

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • notion_download_fileingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datanetwork egress
  • notion_describe_databasereads sensitive datanetwork egress
  • notion_list_files_on_pageingests untrusted inputreads sensitive data
  • notion_search_pagesreads sensitive datanetwork egress
  • notion_list_local_filesreads sensitive data
  • notion_query_databasereads sensitive data
  • notion_query_viewreads sensitive data
  • notion_read_pageingests untrusted input
  • notion_search_databasesreads sensitive data
  • notion_upload_filenetwork egress
Show 34 more tools ↓
  • notion_upload_file_to_databasenetwork egress
  • notion_add_commentno sensitive capability
  • notion_add_file_to_rowno sensitive capability
  • notion_append_contentno sensitive capability
  • notion_archive_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_batch_add_file_to_rowno sensitive capability
  • notion_create_databaseno sensitive capability
  • notion_create_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_create_viewno sensitive capability
  • notion_delete_blockno sensitive capability
  • notion_delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • notion_delete_viewno sensitive capability
  • notion_extract_file_textno sensitive capability
  • notion_get_commentsno sensitive capability
  • notion_get_propertyno sensitive capability
  • notion_get_userno sensitive capability
  • notion_import_file_from_urlno sensitive capability
  • notion_list_usersno sensitive capability
  • notion_list_viewsno sensitive capability
  • notion_move_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_purge_fileno sensitive capability
  • notion_purge_shared_filesno sensitive capability
  • notion_read_page_markdownno sensitive capability
  • notion_render_file_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_replace_fileno sensitive capability
  • notion_replace_page_contentno sensitive capability
  • notion_restore_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_set_page_visualno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_blockno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_commentno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_databaseno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_pageno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_page_contentno sensitive capability
  • notion_update_viewno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 3

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.0 latest F 58/100 3 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: F · 58/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan notion-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Notion 31

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 32 side by side →

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