Nostr Bray MCP Server

nostr-bray npm v3.4.2 Source verified

Published by forgesworn — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust-aware Nostr for AI and humans. Three dimensions of trust -- verification, proximity, and access -- woven into every interaction.

Trust grade
A
90/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 90/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 90/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 7

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: article-read → trust-spoken-challenge → handler-publish. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow article-read → trust-spoken-challenge → handler-publish

high Tool "handler-publish" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "handler-publish" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool handler-publish

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/util/handlers.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/util/handlers.js:288`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nostr-protocol/nips/master/README.md', { signal

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/util/handlers.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "marketplace-probe"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "marketplace-probe" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool marketplace-probe · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "relay-info"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "relay-info" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool relay-info · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained command parameter "stdio_command" on "handler-publish"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "handler-publish" takes a command-shaped parameter "stdio_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool handler-publish · inputSchema.properties.stdio_command

low Mutating tool "handler-publish" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "handler-publish" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool handler-publish

Tools 200

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • article-readingests untrusted input
  • calendar-readingests untrusted input
  • contacts-getingests untrusted input
  • dm-conversationingests untrusted input
  • feed-by-nameingests untrusted input
  • group-chatingests untrusted input
  • group-infoingests untrusted input
  • handler-publishruns code / shell
  • hashtag-feedingests untrusted input
  • identity-backupingests untrusted input
Show 190 more tools ↓
  • marketplace-probenetwork egress
  • nip-readingests untrusted input
  • nip05-relaysingests untrusted input
  • privacy-read-proofingests untrusted input
  • publish-eventnetwork egress
  • relay-countingests untrusted input
  • relay-infoingests untrusted input
  • social-feedingests untrusted input
  • social-notificationsingests untrusted input
  • social-profile-getingests untrusted input
  • trust-spoken-challengereads sensitive data
  • trust-spoken-verifyreads sensitive data
  • article-listno sensitive capability
  • article-publishno sensitive capability
  • badge-acceptno sensitive capability
  • badge-awardno sensitive capability
  • badge-createno sensitive capability
  • badge-listno sensitive capability
  • blossom-checkno sensitive capability
  • blossom-deleteno sensitive capability
  • blossom-discoverno sensitive capability
  • blossom-listno sensitive capability
  • blossom-mirrorno sensitive capability
  • blossom-repairno sensitive capability
  • blossom-serversno sensitive capability
  • blossom-uploadno sensitive capability
  • blossom-usageno sensitive capability
  • blossom-verifyno sensitive capability
  • calendar-createno sensitive capability
  • calendar-rsvpno sensitive capability
  • canary-beacon-checkno sensitive capability
  • canary-beacon-createno sensitive capability
  • canary-duress-detectno sensitive capability
  • canary-duress-signalno sensitive capability
  • canary-group-createno sensitive capability
  • canary-group-currentno sensitive capability
  • canary-group-joinno sensitive capability
  • canary-group-membersno sensitive capability
  • canary-group-verifyno sensitive capability
  • canary-session-createno sensitive capability
  • canary-session-currentno sensitive capability
  • canary-session-verifyno sensitive capability
  • cast-spellno sensitive capability
  • community-approveno sensitive capability
  • community-createno sensitive capability
  • community-feedno sensitive capability
  • community-listno sensitive capability
  • community-postno sensitive capability
  • contacts-followno sensitive capability
  • contacts-searchno sensitive capability
  • contacts-unfollowno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-ackno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-cancelno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-capability-discoverno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-capability-publishno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-capability-readno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-checkno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-failureno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-proposeno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-queryno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-refuseno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-replyno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-sendno sensitive capability
  • dispatch-statusno sensitive capability
  • dm-by-nameno sensitive capability
  • dm-readno sensitive capability
  • dm-sendno sensitive capability
  • execute-actionno sensitive capability
  • group-add-userno sensitive capability
  • group-adminsno sensitive capability
  • group-createno sensitive capability
  • group-deleteno sensitive capability
  • group-delete-eventno sensitive capability
  • group-forum-commentno sensitive capability
  • group-forum-commentsno sensitive capability
  • group-forum-topic-createno sensitive capability
  • group-forum-topicsno sensitive capability
  • group-inspectno sensitive capability
  • group-invite-createno sensitive capability
  • group-joinno sensitive capability
  • group-leaveno sensitive capability
  • group-membersno sensitive capability
  • group-remove-userno sensitive capability
  • group-rolesno sensitive capability
  • group-sendno sensitive capability
  • group-updateno sensitive capability
  • handler-discoverno sensitive capability
  • identity-accept-migrationno sensitive capability
  • identity-backup-shamirno sensitive capability
  • identity-createno sensitive capability
  • identity-deriveno sensitive capability
  • identity-derive-personano sensitive capability
  • identity-listno sensitive capability
  • identity-migrateno sensitive capability
  • identity-proveno sensitive capability
  • identity-restoreno sensitive capability
  • identity-restore-shamirno sensitive capability
  • identity-switchno sensitive capability
  • label-createno sensitive capability
  • label-readno sensitive capability
  • label-removeno sensitive capability
  • label-searchno sensitive capability
  • label-selfno sensitive capability
  • list-bookmarkno sensitive capability
  • list-bookmark-readno sensitive capability
  • list-check-mutedno sensitive capability
  • list-followset-createno sensitive capability
  • list-followset-manageno sensitive capability
  • list-followset-readno sensitive capability
  • list-muteno sensitive capability
  • list-mute-readno sensitive capability
  • list-pinno sensitive capability
  • list-pin-readno sensitive capability
  • listing-closeno sensitive capability
  • listing-createno sensitive capability
  • listing-readno sensitive capability
  • listing-searchno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-announceno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-callno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-compareno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-credentials-clearno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-discoverno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-inspectno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-payno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-reputationno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-retireno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-searchno sensitive capability
  • marketplace-updateno sensitive capability
  • moderation-filterno sensitive capability
  • nip-publishno sensitive capability
  • nip05-lookupno sensitive capability
  • nip05-verifyno sensitive capability
  • post-queue-cancelno sensitive capability
  • post-queue-listno sensitive capability
  • post-scheduleno sensitive capability
  • privacy-commitno sensitive capability
  • privacy-openno sensitive capability
  • privacy-prove-ageno sensitive capability
  • privacy-prove-rangeno sensitive capability
  • privacy-prove-thresholdno sensitive capability
  • privacy-publish-proofno sensitive capability
  • privacy-verify-ageno sensitive capability
  • privacy-verify-rangeno sensitive capability
  • privacy-verify-thresholdno sensitive capability
  • profile-by-nameno sensitive capability
  • relay-addno sensitive capability
  • relay-authno sensitive capability
  • relay-compareno sensitive capability
  • relay-discoverno sensitive capability
  • relay-diversityno sensitive capability
  • relay-listno sensitive capability
  • relay-nip-searchno sensitive capability
  • relay-queryno sensitive capability
  • relay-recommendno sensitive capability
  • relay-setno sensitive capability
  • safety-activateno sensitive capability
  • safety-configureno sensitive capability
  • search-actionsno sensitive capability
  • search-notesno sensitive capability
  • search-profilesno sensitive capability
  • signet-badgeno sensitive capability
  • signet-challengeno sensitive capability
  • signet-credentialsno sensitive capability
  • signet-policy-checkno sensitive capability
  • signet-policy-setno sensitive capability
  • signet-verifiersno sensitive capability
  • signet-vouchno sensitive capability
  • social-deleteno sensitive capability
  • social-postno sensitive capability
  • social-profile-setno sensitive capability
  • social-reactno sensitive capability
  • social-replyno sensitive capability
  • social-repostno sensitive capability
  • sync-planno sensitive capability
  • trust-attestno sensitive capability
  • trust-attest-filterno sensitive capability
  • trust-attest-parseno sensitive capability
  • trust-claimno sensitive capability
  • trust-proof-publishno sensitive capability
  • trust-readno sensitive capability
  • trust-requestno sensitive capability
  • trust-request-listno sensitive capability
  • trust-revokeno sensitive capability
  • trust-ring-proveno sensitive capability
  • trust-ring-verifyno sensitive capability
  • trust-verifyno sensitive capability
  • whoamino sensitive capability
  • wiki-listno sensitive capability
  • wiki-publishno sensitive capability
  • wiki-readno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 7

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v3.4.2 latest A 90/100 7 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v3.3.0 A 90/100 7 1.13.0 2026-09-01
v3.2.2 A 90/100 7 1.12.1 2026-08-23
v3.0.0 A 90/100 7 1.12.1 2026-08-18
v2.4.0 A 90/100 7 1.12.1 2026-08-13
Show 2 more versions ↓
v2.3.0 A 90/100 7 1.12.1 2026-08-07
v1.41.0 A 90/100 7 1.12.1 2026-07-28

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MCP Trust Score: A · 90/100
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