Nodeflare MCP Server
nodeflare-mcp
npm
v0.8.0
Source verified
Published by nodeflare-app — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for NodeFlare RPC — blockchain data on 23 EVM chains for AI agents. Free public tier, API key, or pay-per-call with x402 (USDC on Base/Polygon/Arbitrum).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:508`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await fetch(`https://coins.llama.fi/prices/current/${dll}:${t}`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(6000) }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_logsingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataget_token_allowancesreads sensitive dataget_token_balancereads sensitive dataget_token_metadatareads sensitive dataget_token_pricereads sensitive datacheck_token_safetyno sensitive capabilitycompare_gasno sensitive capabilityeth_callno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_blockno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
get_block_numberno sensitive capabilityget_gas_priceno sensitive capabilityget_multichain_balancesno sensitive capabilityget_transactionno sensitive capabilityget_transaction_receiptno sensitive capabilityget_wallet_reportno sensitive capabilitylist_chainsno sensitive capabilityonchain_answerno sensitive capabilityresolve_ensno sensitive capabilityrpc_callno sensitive capabilitysimulate_transactionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.7.0 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.6.3 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.6.2 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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