Nimbus MCP Server
nimbus-mcp
npm
v1.6.0
Published by h4cd0c — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Nimbus - AWS Security Assessment MCP Server - 45 Tools with Full OWASP MCP Security
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([aws_scan_secrets_manager, Get Secret Value]) and tools that can send data out ([SSM Run Command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [aws_scan_secrets_manager, Get Secret Value] → sinks [SSM Run Command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow aws_scan_secrets_manager → SSM Run Command
high Tool "SSM Run Command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "SSM Run Command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool SSM Run Command
low Mutating tool "SSM Run Command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "SSM Run Command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool SSM Run Command
Tools 87
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
aws_scan_secrets_managerreads sensitive dataGet Secret Valuereads sensitive dataSSM Run Commandruns code / shellAdd Malicious Lambda Layerno sensitive capabilityAttach Administrator Policyno sensitive capabilityAttach Policy to Roleno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_ami_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_api_distribution_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_cloudwatch_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_cross_account_movementno sensitive capability
Show 77 more tools ↓
aws_analyze_ec2_metadata_exposureno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_eks_attack_surfaceno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_encryption_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_iam_trust_chainsno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_iam_usersno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_infrastructure_automationno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_lambda_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_messaging_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_network_exposureno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_network_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_s3_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_analyze_service_role_chainno sensitive capabilityaws_build_attack_chainsno sensitive capabilityaws_cache_clearno sensitive capabilityaws_cache_statsno sensitive capabilityaws_detect_data_exfiltration_pathsno sensitive capabilityaws_detect_mfa_bypass_vectorsno sensitive capabilityaws_detect_permissive_rolesno sensitive capabilityaws_detect_persistence_mechanismsno sensitive capabilityaws_detect_privesc_patternsno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_detection_servicesno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_ec2_instancesno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_eks_clustersno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_iam_rolesno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_organizationsno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_public_resourcesno sensitive capabilityaws_enumerate_rds_databasesno sensitive capabilityaws_generate_security_reportno sensitive capabilityaws_generate_tra_reportno sensitive capabilityaws_get_audit_logsno sensitive capabilityaws_get_guardduty_findingsno sensitive capabilityaws_helpno sensitive capabilityaws_hunt_eks_secretsno sensitive capabilityaws_list_active_regionsno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_all_regionsno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_api_gateway_authno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_container_registry_poisoningno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_eks_irsa_risksno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_eks_service_accountsno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_elasticache_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_lambda_cold_start_risksno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_resource_policiesno sensitive capabilityaws_scan_ssm_securityno sensitive capabilityaws_whoamino sensitive capabilityCreate Access Keyno sensitive capabilityCreate Inline Role Policyno sensitive capabilityCreate Inline User Policyno sensitive capabilityCreate Login Profileno sensitive capabilityCreate Policy Versionno sensitive capabilityDelete CloudTrailno sensitive capabilityDisable GuardDutyno sensitive capabilityEKS Cluster Admin Accessno sensitive capabilityEKS Fargate Profile PassRoleno sensitive capabilityEKS Node Role Credential Theftno sensitive capabilityEKS Wildcard Describeno sensitive capabilityetcd Secrets Encryption Not Enabledno sensitive capabilityIRSA Pod Execution Abuseno sensitive capabilityLambda Environment Variable Secretsno sensitive capabilityLambda Layer Backdoorno sensitive capabilityMissing Control Plane Loggingno sensitive capabilityModify S3 Bucket Policyno sensitive capabilityPassRole to CloudFormationno sensitive capabilityPassRole to CodeBuildno sensitive capabilityPassRole to EC2no sensitive capabilityPassRole to ECS Taskno sensitive capabilityPassRole to Glueno sensitive capabilityPassRole to Lambdano sensitive capabilityPassRole to SageMakerno sensitive capabilityPublic API Server Endpointno sensitive capabilityS3 Data Exfiltrationno sensitive capabilitySet Default Policy Versionno sensitive capabilitySSM Parameter Store Secretsno sensitive capabilitySSM Start Sessionno sensitive capabilityStop CloudTrail Loggingno sensitive capabilityUpdate Assume Role Policyno sensitive capabilityUpdate Lambda Codeno sensitive capabilityUpdate Login Profileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (87 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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