Nexus Mcp Agent — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "nexus-mcp-agent",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "nexus-mcp-agent"
},
"server": {
"name": "nexus-mcp-agent"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 80,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (197 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: agent_catalog → cicd_get_logs → cmd_spawn. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "agent_catalog → cicd_get_logs → cmd_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"agent_catalog",
"browse",
"browse_status",
"browse_screenshot",
"browse_click",
"catalog_fetch",
"web_search",
"web_fetch",
"web_scrape",
"web_search_dashscope"
],
"sources": [
"cicd_get_logs"
],
"sinks": [
"subagent_spawn",
"cmd_spawn"
],
"path": [
"agent_catalog",
"cicd_get_logs",
"cmd_spawn"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "agent_catalog",
"to": "cicd_get_logs",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "cicd_get_logs",
"to": "cmd_spawn",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"subagent_spawn\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"subagent_spawn\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "subagent_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"cmd_spawn\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"cmd_spawn\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "cmd_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/dev.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/dev.js:107`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/dev.js"
},
"evidence": "rch text=\"TODO|password|eval(\"', ' 4. Run reason_reflect on any failed checks and propose corrections',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/tools/dev.js",
"line": 107,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/shell.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/shell.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/shell.js"
},
"evidence": "nSync, execSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join } from 'path'; // Resolve the bes",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/shell.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/agent-loop.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/agent-loop.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/agent-loop.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFile, readdir } from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/agent-loop.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/bg.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/bg.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/bg.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { getDataDir } from '../core/config.js'; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/bg.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/checkpoint.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/checkpoint.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/checkpoint.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; function git(args, cwd) { const opts = { cwd: cwd || process.cwd(), encoding",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/checkpoint.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/lint-fix.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/lint-fix.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/lint-fix.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readdir } from 'fs/promises'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/lint-fix.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/project.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/project.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/project.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { resolveSafePath } from '../core/safe-path.js'; import { logError } from",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/project.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/sandbox.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/sandbox.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/sandbox.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { mkdtemp, writeFile, rm } from 'fs/promises'; import { tmpdir } from 'os",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/sandbox.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/security.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/security.js"
},
"evidence": "te)' }, { pattern: /exec(?:Sync)?\\s*\\(/i, label: 'Command Execution' }, { pattern: /new\\s+Function\\s*\\(/i, label",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/security.js",
"line": 23,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/terminal.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/terminal.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/terminal.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resolve } from 'path'; import { parse",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/terminal.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/testing/test-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/testing/test-runner.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/testing/test-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const FRAME",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/testing/test-runner.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/web.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/web.js:188`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/web.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1/chat/completions', { me",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/tools/web.js",
"line": 188,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/shell.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/shell.js:135`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/shell.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync(`taskkill /pid ${child.pid} /f /t 2>nul`, { stdio: 'ignore' });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/core/shell.js",
"line": 135,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/checkpoint.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/checkpoint.js:6`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/checkpoint.js"
},
"evidence": "try { return execSync(`git ${args.join(' ')}`, opts).toString().trim(); } catch (e) { if (e.s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/checkpoint.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/automation.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/automation.js:7`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/automation.js"
},
"evidence": "'; return await import(mod); } catch { const error = [ '❌ Playwright not installed.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/tools/automation.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"subagent_spawn\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"subagent_spawn\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "subagent_spawn"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"cmd_spawn\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"cmd_spawn\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "cmd_spawn"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"agent_catalog",
"browse",
"browse_status",
"browse_screenshot",
"browse_click",
"catalog_fetch",
"web_search",
"web_fetch",
"web_scrape",
"web_search_dashscope"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"cicd_get_logs"
],
"externalSink": [
"subagent_spawn",
"cmd_spawn"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"agent_catalog",
"cicd_get_logs",
"cmd_spawn"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: agent_catalog → cicd_get_logs → cmd_spawn."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "tool_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tool_load",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_loop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_catalog",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "agent_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_load",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_delegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_delete",
"tags": [],
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