Nextjs Agent MCP Server
nextjs-agent-mcp
npm
v0.7.4
Source verified
Published by zohaib3249 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server to drive and inspect a running Next.js app: headless route/error introspection + a real-event in-page browser bridge (click, fill, snapshot, React fiber tree, network, storage, eval) — no Playwright.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval
high Dynamic code execution in server code (bridge/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`bridge/index.js:1438`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: al(code) { const fn = new Function(`"use strict"; return (async () => { ${/\breturn\b/.test(code) ? code : "return ("
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bridge/index.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (bridge/src/agent-bridge.client.tsx)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`bridge/src/agent-bridge.client.tsx:1750`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: o-new-func const fn = new Function(`"use strict"; return (async () => { ${/\breturn\b/.test(code) ? code : 'return ('
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bridge/src/agent-bridge.client.tsx
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modeA/errors.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modeA/errors.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createReadStream, watch } from 'node:fs'; import { createInterface } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modeA/errors.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/modeB/chrome.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/modeB/chrome.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { request } from 'node:http'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/modeB/chrome.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([network_calls]) co-exist with external-action tools ([eval]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [network_calls] → sinks [eval]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow network_calls → eval
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "eval"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "eval" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool eval · inputSchema.properties.code
low Mutating tool "eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
evalruns code / shellnetwork_callsingests untrusted inputagent_infono sensitive capabilityattach_logno sensitive capabilitybatchno sensitive capabilitybridge_statusno sensitive capabilitycacheno sensitive capabilitychrome_activate_tabno sensitive capabilitychrome_close_tabno sensitive capabilitychrome_launchno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
chrome_open_tabno sensitive capabilitychrome_tabsno sensitive capabilityclaim_tabno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilitycomponent_forno sensitive capabilitycomponentsno sensitive capabilityconsole_messagesno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilityget_errorsno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilityopen_tabno sensitive capabilityoverviewno sensitive capabilitypage_contextno sensitive capabilityrelease_tabno sensitive capabilityreloadno sensitive capabilityrerenderno sensitive capabilityroute_mapno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilityset_fieldno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilitystart_dev_serverno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitystop_dev_serverno sensitive capabilitystorageno sensitive capabilitythinkno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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