Mysql (neverinfamous) MCP Server
@neverinfamous/mysql-mcp
npm
v5.1.1
Source verified
Published by neverinfamous — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Enterprise-grade MySQL MCP Server with OAuth 2.1 authentication, connection pooling & tool filtering
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-HKS2F7JC.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-HKS2F7JC.js:951`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s: require(), process., eval(), Function(), import(). Use mysql.* API instead.", category: ErrorCategory.VALIDATION,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-HKS2F7JC.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/utils/error-suggestions.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/error-suggestions.ts:395`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s: require(), process., eval(), Function(), import(). Use mysql.* API instead.", category: ErrorCategory.VALIDATION,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/error-suggestions.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-W6C2YLTD.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-W6C2YLTD.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Buffer as Buffer$1 } from 'buffer'; import * as crypto2 from 'crypto';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-W6C2YLTD.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/common.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/common.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { relative, resolve } from "path"; import * as path from "path"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/common.ts
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/e2e/codemode.spec.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e/codemode.spec.ts:172`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; test("should block eval()", async () => { const client = await createClient(); try { const p = await
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e/codemode.spec.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-cli-sessions.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-cli-sessions.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; const delay = (ms) => new Promise(res => setTimeout(res, ms)); async function
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-cli-sessions.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-progress.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-progress.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { resolve, dirname } from "path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-progress.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-prompts.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-prompts.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { resolve, dirname } from "path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-prompts.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-tool-annotations.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-tool-annotations.mjs:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; // ============================================================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-tool-annotations.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-zod-errors.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-zod-errors.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import { dirname, join } from "path"; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-zod-errors.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/backup.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/backup.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: m "vitest"; import * as child_process from "child_process"; import { createMockRequestContext, createMockMySQLAdapte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/backup.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/common.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/common.test.ts:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { EventEmitter } from "events"; // Mock child_process vi.mock("child_pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/common.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/data-transfer.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/data-transfer.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: m "vitest"; import * as child_process from "child_process"; import { createMockRequestContext, createMockMySQLAdapte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adapters/mysql/tools/shell/__tests__/data-transfer.test.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.1.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v5.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v4.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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